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Social Structure and Party Choice in Peru  
- Labor and the Left in the 1980 Elections 
 
Introduction 
 
In their seminal work in 1967 on the impact of social structure on party system 
formation, Lipset and Rokkan found that the economic cleavage resulting from 
industrialization had effect on workers’ party choice in all Western European countries 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1990). Later research has confirmed a strong relationship between 
social class and voting behavior in several European countries, but also identified a 
weak relationship in e.g. Great Britain and the United States (Rose and Urwin 1969; 
Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Nieuwbeerta 1990; Franklin et al. 1992). Thus, the 
strength of social structure on party choice has varied across countries. The purpose of 
this thesis is to measure the impact of social structure on voting in a Latin American 
context through quantitative and qualitative analyses of Peruvian industry labor’s 
support to the left parties at national and sub-national level in the 1980 presidential 
election.  
The following concrete research questions are asked in order to analyze the 
relationship between social structure and party choice. Specific hypotheses will later 
be developed in order to provide answers: 
 
1) Was the level of workers’ left party support above the national average? Where 
there differences in support levels for respectively the communists and for the 
social democrats? Did support to the left parties increase with the level of 
industrialization? These questions are included for descriptive analyses of 
national averages and will measure the overall salience of social structure on 
party choice.  
2) In which geographical regions were industry workers’ support to the 
communists strongest, and where did APRA votes dominate? What 
characterized the local communities in these regions? How can the observed 
differences be explained?  
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The 1980 election was the first free and fair political competition in the Peru’s 
history in which all citizens were entitled to vote and all existing political parties were 
permitted to compete. Prior to the Constitution of 1979, analphabets were excluded 
from the right to vote, among them industry workers in the poor Andean highlands 
such as Apurímac, Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Cusco, where they represented 
between 30 % and 50 % of the population. APRA shared the historical origins and 
focus with the Partido Comunista. The former was prohibited from the 1930s and until 
the 1950s, when it left its radical ideology. The Partido Comunista, prohibited since 
the 1930s, and the New Left parties founded during the 1960s were legalized during 
the 1970s and competed in elections for the first time in the 1979 Constituent 
Assembly Election and the 1980 election. Consequently, the 1980 election provides 
the first historical case for the study of the relationship between industrialization and 
political response in which all citizens voted and the whole range of political 
alternatives were included.  
There is some controversy with respect of the classification of the Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) as a Social Democratic party, or whether it should 
be labeled a populist party, and its location in the center-left or the center in the 
political space in 1980 (discussion follows in Chapter two). In order to empirically 
examine the impact of the economic cleavage on APRA votes, analyses will be done 
both for the overall left support (APRA and the communists), and separately for 
respectively the APRA and the communist parties.  
This is the first commune level quantitative analysis of voting behavior in Peru. 
The units of analysis are the 1682 communes or distritos existing in Peru in 1980. 
Variables from aggregate election and census data, digitalized for the purpose of this 
study, are combined with a geographical database in order to analyze voting patterns. 
The dataset (Microsoft Excel or SPSS format) used in this thesis is available upon 
request for the Thesis Committee members. In order to accomplish with the standard 
of replication (King 1995; King 2003), the dataset is also available upon request for 
researchers at dag.p.svendsen@consultant.com.  
Chapter one presents theories that explain the relationship between social structure 
and political response, in addition to the specific hypotheses that will test the 
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implications of the theories. Lipset and Rokkan (1990) provide a broad theory of the 
historical development of social cleavages and their constitutive role in the formation 
of political parties and party systems up to the 1920s in Western Europe. Lafferty 
(1974) presents an integrated deductive-nomothetic and inductive-contextual 
theoretical approach that goes beyond Lipset and Rokkan in the sense of explaining 
sub-national variation in political labor response (Lafferty 1974: 1). Finally, Knutsen 
(2004), in a contemporary study identifies the role of crossing cleavages and their 
weakening or strengthening effects on class voting. At the end of the Chapter, a brief 
overview of class voting research in Latin America is presented. On one hand, Dix 
discards the existence of cleavage based voting and cleavage based political parties. 
On the other, Petras, Soares, Cameron, and Tuesta find through empirical analyses that 
social structure did had salience on voting behavior in the cases they studied.  
Chapter two presents sources, data, operationalizations, and methodology. Some of 
the most recent methodological contributions in the field of Political Science and 
Political Geography, including innovative software, are used in the analysis of the 
aggregate data. Gary King’s method of Ecological Inference and his software package 
EzI estimates individual electoral behavior from aggregate electoral data (King 1997). 
Luc Anselin’s GeoDa provides a series of spatial statistical techniques in order to 
identify geographical clustering of left party support (Anselin 2004). 
Chapter three summarizes the basic characteristics of the development of the 
economic cleavage in Peru. Emphasis is given to the interaction between the main 
actors in this process, and to the uneven speed and geographic concentration of the 
industrialization process.  
Chapter four presents the empirical data analyses. The first part of the Chapter 
presents national averages of the ecological estimates of labor’s overall left party, 
communist, and APRA support. In the second part, the ecological estimates are 
analyzed with spatial statistical techniques in order to identify regional differences in 
labor’s vote for the communists and APRA. 
Chapter five discusses the empirical results presented in the foregoing Chapter. A 
discussion of the national level findings is followed by an assessment of the combined 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of regional differences in support to the 
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communists and the APRA. Finally, new hypotheses derived from the insight gained 
in this study and suggestions of new directions of research will be presented. 
Chapter six contains a critical summary and the conclusions of the empirical 
findings and the overall use of theory, data, and methods. 
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1. Theoretical approaches to social structure and 
party choice 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Neither the working class nor the left parties in Peru by 1980 were homogenous 
entities. Variation in the pace, extent, and the nature of the socioeconomic changes 
brought about by industrialization resulted in diverging demands, according to 
differences in work and living conditions, and to ideological convictions. These 
differences grossly traced a division between workers with respectively radical and 
moderate political demands, the former voting for the communists, the latter for the 
Social Democrats. In addition, we may also expect that sectors of waged labor did not 
vote for left parties, but supported other political alternatives. Workers’ primary 
political identity may rather have been religious, ethnical, or regional, than class based. 
Alternatively, other factors, such as patron-client relations, may have had effect on 
voting preferences. 
In Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal article from 1967, the authors present a cleavage 
theory that explains the basic characteristics of the structural relationship between 
industrialization and political response. Their main hypothesis is that industrialization, 
given certain conditions, produced an economic cleavage, i.e. that social structure, 
mediated by unions and left parties, had effect on workers party choice. However, as 
the authors acknowledged, the theory may be too broad and lack the required 
specificity in dealing with sub-national variation in workers’ voting behavior. Lafferty 
presents a level specific theory through his local community typology, accounting for 
sub-national contextual factors in the explanation of observed variation in labor’s 
political response. Knutsen’s theory takes the analysis still further. He explains why 
and how crossing conflict lines, such as the religious or regional cleavages, may 
weaken the effect of class on voting. Finally, the Chapter closes with a brief overview 
of some relevant theories on social structure and party choice in Latin American. 
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1.2 Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory  
In Party Systems and Voter Alignment (1990), Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein 
Rokkan traced the historical development of social cleavages and the relationship 
between the cleavages and the formation of political parties and structuring of party 
systems in Western Europe. The cleavages were consequences of the National and the 
Industrial Revolutions and produced two crossing conflict dimensions with four poles. 
The Centre-periphery dimension reflected conflicts between geographical regions, 
often between the Capital and peripheral provinces, and was related to ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious differences between those regions. The conflict between state 
and Church represented the cleavage between the state led secularization of education 
and the influence of the Church in the same sector, and more generally between state 
led modernization and the historical and cultural privileges of the Church. The conflict 
in the labor market opposed owners and employers against the employees and the 
conflict in the commodity market developed between producers and buyers of 
agricultural products, and as a consequence thereof, between rural and urban regions 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1990: 130).  
The political representation of the social cleavages occurred gradually and after 
passing successive thresholds, or political barriers (Lipset and Rokkan 1990: 113). The 
thresholds included the legitimation of political actors, the incorporation of different 
actors in the political system, the representation of the political actors in the political 
system, and the extent to which the political actor was able to reach executive power.  
Further, Lipset and Rokkan argue that the social cleavages that articulated political 
parties and structured the party systems in Western Europe occurred while the 
thresholds for political participation still were quite high. From this follows the 
hypothesis of the ”freezing” of the structure of the party systems: Parties founded 
around 1920 and before the extension of the rights of suffrage, were to be preserved 
despite posterior social and economic changes (Randall 2001: 241). 
Due to the limits of space in the present thesis, the threshold and the “freezing” 
hypotheses will not be discussed further. The historical situatedness of Lipset and 
Rokkan’s cleavage theory and the role of cleavages in party system formation are 
neither subject of analysis. What is to be explained through Lipset and Rokkan’s 
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theory is the translation of economic conflicts resulting from industrialization into 
political response in 20th century Peru, i.e. the development of an economic cleavage. 
Lipset and Rokkan emphasize the importance of the economic cleavage in 
explaining voting behavior. While the three first cleavages were most important in 
accounting for differences between party systems, the economic cleavage was 
important for explaining variation within a given party system. “(I)n sheer statistical 
terms, the fourth cleavage line will in at least half of the cases under consideration 
explain much more of the variance in the distributions of full-suffrage votes than any 
one of the others” (Lipset and Rokkan 1990: 128). 
Second, the presence of an array of different lower-class mass parties, some 
radical, some moderate, some unified and others fragmented, was a common 
phenomenon in Western Europe because of industrialization (Lipset and Rokkan 1990: 
121). The raise of these parties presupposed though the development of a relationship 
between industrialization and labor response. Some basic conditions existed: 
 
 “(A)ll countries of Western Europe developed lower-class mass parties at some point or other 
before World War I. These were rarely unified into one single working-class party. In Latin 
Europe the lower-class movements were sharply divided among revolutionary anarchist, 
anarcho-syndicalist, and Marxist factions on the one hand and revisionist socialists on the 
other (Lipset and Rokkan 1990: 121). 
 
”The rising masses of wage-earners, whether in large-scale farming, in forestry, or in industry, 
resented their conditions of work and the insecurity of their contracts, and many of them felt 
socially and culturally alienated from the owners and the employers. The result was the 
formation of a variety of labour unions and the development of nationwide Socialist parties. 
The success of such movements depended on a variety of factors: the strength of the 
paternalist traditions of ascriptive recognition of the worker status, the size of the work unit 
and the local ties of the workers, the level of prosperity and the stability of employment in the 
given industry, and the chances of improvements and promotion through loyal devotion or 
through education and achievement” (Lipset and Rokkan 1990: 108). 
 
Another factor that influenced the salience of the economic cleavage in voting 
behavior was the position of the Church in relation to the State. Lipset and Rokkan 
found that the worker class tended to be much more divided in countries were: 
 
”…the ’nation-builders’ and the Church were openly or latently opposed to each other during 
the crucial phases of educational development and mass mobilization … than in the countries 
where the Church had, at least initially, sided with the nation-builders against some common 
enemy outside…” (Lipset and Rokkan 1990: 132). 
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There were thus factors that strengthened or weakened the formation of an economic 
cleavage. Consequently, to predict the existence of political movements originating in 
the conflict between labor and capital was relatively easy; identifying factors that 
reinforced or debilitated these movements or political parties, their capacity to 
mobilize the underprivileged classes for action, were more difficult: 
 
”To predict the presence of such movements was simple; to predict which ones would be 
strong and which ones weak, which ones unified and which ones split down the middle, 
required much more knowledge of national conditions and developments and a much more 
elaborate model of the historical interaction process. Our three-step model does not go this far 
for any party; it predicts the presence of such-and-such parties in polities characterized by 
such-and-such cleavages, but it does not give any formula for accounting for the strength or 
the cohesion of any one party” (Lipset and Rokkan 1990: 129). 
  
Such a “formula” may be built into the model by adding a series of variables, as the 
percent that speak different languages and dialects, percent members or followers of 
the Church or with dissenter associations, concentration of wealth etc. (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1990: 129).  
Two basic implications are derived from Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory. 
First, industrialization produced an economic cleavage, which often had a strong effect 
on workers party choice. Consequently, the cleavage theory is strengthened if Peruvian 
workers’ vote for the left parties in 1980 was above the national average. However, the 
eventual numerical confirmation of above average labor vote to left parties does not 
imply that workers’ party choice was cleavage based. Other variables may explain the 
relationship between social structure and party choice. On the other side, the theory is 
not straightforwardly weakened if labor support was below the national average. 
National averages may hide as much as they reveal. Variation in the degree of 
politization of the economic conflicts within the worker class may have existed, 
explaining the prevalence of left votes in some sectors while it was absent in others.  
The second implication will add further understanding of social structure’s 
effect on party choice: the strength of the movements grown out of the economic 
cleavage depended on a series of factors, such as the size of the work unit, local ties of 
the workers, stability of employment, and the level of prosperity in a given industry. 
Consequently, the cleavage theory is strengthened if left party support is higher in 
communes with high proportions of industrial workers (as a proxy for the “rising 
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masses of wage-earners” and the size of the working unit, i.e. concentration of waged 
labor). However, as in the case of the first implication, the cleavage theory is not 
straightforwardly weakened if a linear relation is absent. Intraclass variation may have 
existed, some sectors of labor may have been politized while others not. Additional 
variables are needed in order to understand the relationship between social structure 
and party choice. 
 
1.3 Lafferty’s typology of local community contexts  
Parts of a “formula” that would complement Lipset and Rokkan’s model and 
contribute to the explanation of ”the strength or the cohesion of any one party” (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1990: 129) and radical or moderate labor response is provided by 
Lafferty’s typology of local community contexts. In Industrialization, Community 
Structure and Socialism (Lafferty 1974) he constructs a framework for ecological 
analysis of labor’s response to industrialization, parting from a typology of four local 
community contexts. Lafferty’s independent variables are the different effects of 
“structural strain” resulting from industrialization. The dependent variable is seen as 
“an aspect of the symbolic function of ecological adaptation” while the independent 
variables are connected to the “institutional change associated with industrial techno-
structural development” (Lafferty 1974: 25). The community ecosystem frames the 
interaction between the variables, which ”implies the holistic adaptation of populations 
to their environments” (ibid.).  
Processes of symbiosis1 and commensalismen2 integrate the parts - population, 
technology, and organization - in a community ecosystem (Lafferty 1974: 25). The 
two aspects exist in all types of local communities, constitute the basis of a 
community’s cohesion, and are seen as the core concepts in a series of sociological 
dichotomies, as in mechanic versus organic solidarity in Durkheim, and gemeinschaft 
versus gesellschaft in Tönnies. (Lafferty 1974: 26-27). Corporate and categoric 
                                                 
1 “Symbiosis (…) is an interaction between two organisms living together in more or less intimate association or even the 
merging of two dissimilar organisms” (www.wikipedia.com). 
2 “In ecology, commensalism is an interaction between two living organisms, where one creature benefits and the other is 
neither harmed nor helped. As with all ecological interactions, commensalisms vary in strength and duration from intimate, 
long-lived symbioses to brief, weak interactions through intermediaries. The term commensalism derives from the Latin com 
mensa, meaning sharing a table. Originally it was used to describe the use of waste food by second animals, like the carcass 
eaters who follow hunting animals, but wait until they have finished their meal” (definiton from www.wikipedia.com). 
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groups are related to symbiosis and commensalism. Corporate groups have developed 
from symbiotic relations in society and are internally differentiated, symbiotically 
integrated, and constitute minor units in a larger societal context (Lafferty 1974: 27). 
A categoric group is an ”association of functionally homogeneous individuals”, most 
frequently a specific occupational class. Categoric groups are the organized form of 
commensalistic relations and are therefore more than a simple static concept. In 
addition, ”(t)he more specialized an institution becomes, the larger the community 
must be to support it.  
Lafferty presents four ideal types of local community contexts in order to 
explain the relation between industrialization and political response. Type I 
communities, characterized by corporate segmentation are found in relatively 
undifferentiated communities that have little degree of control over their localities. 
Low-technology, family-centered agricultural or small artisan units, in which values 
and norms are integrated further typifies these communities. The socialist potential is 
weak because labor ideology is not needed to resolve problems related to the locality’s 
adaptation to industrialization (Lafferty 1974: 36). 
 
        Categoric consciousness 
Weak     Strong 
 
Type I: Corporate Segmentation  Type II: Categoric Stratification 
Segmented, traditional society  Hierarchic, agricultural or industrial 
with nondifferentiated familial  society with differentiated, monotypical 
corporate groups.    corporate groups. 
  
Socialist Potential: Weak, intra-  Socialist Potential: Strong and radical;  
  corporate status equality, weak  intracorporate status inequality, strong  
  categoric consciousness.   categoric consciousness; the “discontented”.    
  Theory-I Type: Non   Theory-I: Vulgar Marxism and Marxism 
 
Type III: Corporate Competition  Type IV: Corporate Pluralism 
  Structurally disrupted society with  “Modern Industrial” society, with integrated  
  competing, non-integrated corporate  multitypical corporate groups. 
  groups. 
  
Socialist Potential: Strong and radical;  Socialist Potential: Strong and moderate; weak 
  both intra-corporate and status incon-  intra-corporate status inequality and high cate- 
  sistency and low categoric conscious-  goric consciousness; the “relatively satisfied”. 
  ness; the “anomic”. 
 
  Theory-I Type: Anomie and Curvi-  Theory-I Type: Vulgar Marxism, Curvilinearity 
  linearity. 
 
(Source: Lafferty 1974: 36) 
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Type II communities, characterized by categoric stratification, include 
communities stratified along occupational classes in layered hierarchies. Differences 
of status are significant, corporate group integration is weak. Examples are 
commercial agricultural units and communes characterized by isolated extraction 
activity in e.g. mining. Categoric consciousness is strong due to differentiation of 
occupational classes, in addition to high levels of awareness of similarity (Lafferty 
1974: 21). This may lead to organized protests, as peasant uprisings, religious 
sectarism, or prototype labor movements. Communities are dependent on external 
trade, technologically more complex and have more population than Type I (Lafferty 
1974: 36). The communist ideal, emphasizing the transference of power, or corporate 
control to the lower strata is the most attractive alternative. The social democratic 
option, implying reforms towards a corporative integrated political community, has 
little sense. 
Type III, corporate competition, is characterized by the ”invasion” of a 
different type of corporate unit which interrupts the structural balance that exist in 
Type I and II without the replacement of old by new symbolic structures. In cases 
where agricultural communities of Type II are invaded by a corporate group, e.g. 
mining activity, the encounter between the types is characterized by a mild 
confrontation because both are stratified. Invasion of Type I is different: Huge 
differences exist, confusion of norms and status may lead to anomie. Radical labor 
response augments with increased loss of norms and status. In invaded Type I 
communities, direct action, and anarcho-syndicalism may be preferred alternatives in 
invaded by creating an immediate group identity. In Type II, Communism is preferred 
due to the stronger development of categoric group traditions (Lafferty 1974: 39).  
In Type IV, corporate pluralism, we find the modern industrial form of socially 
complex organization. These communities are, according to Lafferty, the result of a 
compromise of resolved conflicts in Type III, resulting in less control of norms and 
less status inequality. Categoric consciousness is strong; segmented occupational 
classes and high mobility led to increased awareness. The Socialist potential is strong 
because of a high level of class-consciousness. Due to comparatively high levels of 
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community prosperity, dominant political values are stability, continuity, and welfare 
policies (Lafferty 1974: 40). 
Some modifications of Lafferty’s typology are done in order to adapt the ideal 
types to available data and the research strategy. First, Type I communities, i.e. small 
agricultural units, are not included; the analysis is delimited to wage labor in industry. 
Second, Type II and III communities are aggregated into one ideal type of response, 
subsequently denominated Type A. What is of interest is the variation in labor’s 
radical versus moderate left vote, which justifies the aggregation of the two ideal types 
of radical response into one. Communities of type II and III have in common a strong 
radical socialist potential, even if the underlying conditions that explain this common 
potential are different (i.e. are explained with vulgar Marxist and Marxist theory 
versus anomie and curvilinearity theories). What the two types have in common 
though, is their shared characteristics of being peripheral or semi-peripheral, relatively 
deprived communities, characterized by mono-industrial activity. Third, local 
communities of Lafferty’s Type IV are here denominated Type B, and include those 
characterized by modern, diversified industrial activities, relatively high levels of 
stratification, and where socioeconomic differences are less pronounced than in Type 
A. In these communities, the socialist potential is strong, but in moderate, social 
democratic direction (Lafferty 1974: 40). 
The identification of geographical clustering of strong communist support in 
type A regions and strong Social Democrat support in type B regions will strengthen 
the theory. On the other side, the theory will be weakened if these relations are absent.  
The empirical analyses may show low support to communists in type A regions 
and high communist support in type B regions. A central hypothesis in the explanation 
of factors that weakens the economic cleavage’s salience on voting behavior is that of 
crossing cleavage lines. The main political identity of industry labor may not be that of 
leftist labor ideology. Other identities may be more important. 
 
1.4 Knutsen: The effect of crossing cleavages on class vote 
Knutsen’s (2004) contribution underlines the comparative differences in the 
salience of different cleavages on voting behavior. In his research, he analyzes the 
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comparative variations in the impact of different structural variables on party choice in 
seven European in the period 1970-1997. Knutsen’s analyses are relevant for this 
thesis due to the potential salience of crossing cleavages in the explanation of variation 
in class voting. 
The effect of the religious cleavage on party choice shows larger variation 
between the eight West European countries in the analysis. The most important 
polarization along the religious cleavage concerns to a large degree the left party 
voters versus the Right party voters. Especially in the Catholic and religiously mixed 
countries as Netherland, Belgium, Italy, and France, and mainly in the period 1970-
1984, a significantly higher proportion of voters with a high score on the religious 
indicators, measured by church membership and frequency of mass assistance, are to 
find among the left parties’ voters. In the case of the Protestant countries of Great 
Britain and Denmark, high score on the religious indicators have a much lower 
correlation with left vote. The tendencies in the majority of the countries in the period 
1970-1997 converge in direction of somewhat lower correlation, but with respect of 
the whole period, the stability is more remarkable than the variation (Knutsen 2004: 
128).  
The cleavage between rural and urban regions reflects the interests of 
agriculture and the rural population, mainly centered on the conflict in the commodity 
market between producers and buyers of agricultural products. Knutsen emphasizes 
Lipset and Rokkan’s findings (1990): In a majority of countries, the cleavage between 
rural and urban regions was seldom expressed directly in the party systems. Distinctive 
Agrarian parties surged only when strong cultural conflicts made the economical 
conflicts deeper and bitterer (Knutsen 2004: 132). Knutsen finds that the rural-urban 
cleavage has strong effect on socialist vote and is strongest in Denmark, which is the 
only country in the study with a distinctive Agrarian party (the other two Scandinavian 
countries are not included in the analyses). The Christian Democrats and the 
Conservatives parties receive stronger support from the rural population than from the 
inhabitants of the bigger cities. All the left parties receive the strongest vote from the 
urban population and the main differences along the rural-urban cleavage concerns the 
left Socialists, communists, and the Green. Sector also shows high effect on voting in 
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the eight countries. The effect of this cleavage is more important within the service 
sector (public versus private) than in the other socioeconomic classes. Public 
employees vote largely for the leftist parties, while the Right receives most votes from 
private employees. 
No specific hypothesis will be derived from Knutsen because of the absence of 
relevant data for their tests. However, in the discussion of the empirical results, the 
effect of crossing cleavages will be considered.  
 
1.5 Studies of social structure and voting behavior in Latin America  
Maxwell A. Cameron (1994) argues that social class had a strong effect on 
voting in Peru during the 1980s. He presents bivariate correlations between percent 
left votes – including only communist and New Marxist parties, defining APRA as 
belonging to the political Center - and percent workers in all of Lima’s communes. 
Cameron argues that the correlation values “…demonstrate remarkably strong, stable, 
and statistically significant ecological correlations between the size of major social 
groups in Lima and the shares of the vote for ideological parties” (Cameron 1994: 20). 
The bivariate correlations between votes for the communist parties and workers for the 
25 communes shows that for parliament and commune elections between the 
Constituent Assembly in 1978 to the parliamentary elections in 1989 shows a 
Pearson’s r between .864 and .934. Cameron also refers to survey data from 1983 
(N=595), covering Lima metropolitan area: Data show that respectively 39 % and 52 
% in the “upper and lower working class” voted for the left, compared to 30 % of the 
”lower middle class” and 23 % of the ”high class” and ”upper middle class” (the latter, 
by the way, being a remarkable high percentage). Ecological correlations between 
working class and APRA votes varied from - .056 in the 1980 presidential election to 
.695 in the 1989 municipal election. 
Soares and Hamblin’s applied logistic regression analyses on the dependent 
variable percent votes to the Marxist candidate Allende in a study of Chilean 
radicalism in 1967 (Lafferty 1974: 44). The statistically significant positive beta 
coefficients were percent divorced, percent in urban areas (2500 or more), percent 
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employed in mining and in primary sector. The negative coefficients were percent with 
high school or higher education, and percent immigrants (op.cit.: 46).  
Petras and Zeitlin’s findings in 1967 support Soares and Hamblin. The units of 
analysis were communes and they analyzed the effects of regional proximity of radical 
core-areas (Lafferty 1974: 45). Petras and Zeitlin identified the mining regions as the 
most important factor in Chilean radicalism. The effect of mining communities’ 
radicalism on neighboring and more peripheral localities showed that 93 % of the 
mining communities presented high support to radical left parties in the elections in 
1958 and 1964. Neighboring communes presented the second highest support, while 
support to the radical left was moderate in communes without common borders to 
mining communities. The mining communities had a diffusion effect on contiguous 
geographical areas, both in primary and non-primary sector communes. The neighbor 
effect showed that the political differences between socioeconomic classes tended to 
disappear in mining communes and their satellite communes (Lafferty 1974: 47).  
Robert Dix (1989) discusses to what degree the cleavage model is relevant in 
explaining the development of Latin American political parties and party systems and 
to what extent European historical experiences may constitute a comparative basis for 
studies of Latin American developmental patterns. In Europe, cleavages developed 
before the existence of party systems, while the Latin American party systems and the 
political parties were formed in a parallel development. The Latin American countries 
have also a different historical development with respect of opposition and 
polarization; the pattern has instead been popular loyalty to the elites, not collective 
class mobilization in order to achieve political power. Dix concludes therefore that 
mass based class parties did not develope in Latin America. Even when mass parties 
were formed, the result was a pragmatic, multi-class party basis, in contrast to the class 
centered mass parties in Europe.  
 
1.6 Discussion 
Lipset and Rokkan’s hypothesis states in short that the economic cleavage 
resulting from industrialization will influence workers’ voting behavior in situations 
where masses of wage labor is concentrated, and labor unions and left parties are 
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present. The degree of workers’ left vote is then a measure of the economic cleavage’s 
salience on voting behavior. If workers vote for the left to a higher extent than the rest 
of the population, then the hypothesis is strengthened. 
However, the mere numerical fact that workers’ average vote to the left was 
above the national average does not necessarily imply that their party choice was 
cleavage based. First, this would be a tautological argument. Second, Lipset and 
Rokkan’s loose definition of “cleavage” make it difficult to discriminate between 
effects of the cleavage and other intervening variables on voting (Bartolini 2000: 15-
25; Sartori 1990: 162). Third, national averages may hide as much as they reveal 
about the relationship between social structure and party choice because eventual 
variation within the working class is not measured.  
The tautology may be avoided through a more precise definition of “economic 
cleavage”. What is clear is that the economic cleavage was a consequence of 
industrialization; economic conflicts surged as workers demanded higher pay and 
better working conditions. However, as Bartolini argues, the term “cleavage” implies 
more than referring to the existence of an economic conflict; the economic cleavage 
manifest itself and is formed in the translation of economic conflicts into political 
response. Further, as Sartori argues, class action comprises class voting, but the vice 
versa is not true. The relative strength of labor unionism is both a cause and a 
consequence of class politics (Sartori 1990: 168). In addition to statistical evidence of 
voting preferences, a description of the process of cleavage formation, including the 
main actors therein, is necessary in order to isolate effects from class condition versus 
other effects (ibid.). 
The main expectation in Lafferty’s theory is that moderate left support are 
expected in comparatively prosperous, modern, complex industrialized regions, and 
radical left support is expected in local community contexts characterized by relatively 
poor, mono-industrial enclaves, surrounded by otherwise traditional community 
structures. However, non-structural variables may have stronger effect than social 
structure on the observed variation. As Sartori argues, “organizational coverage and 
pressure” is an important intervening variable and the empirical findings may support 
the hypothesis that a “thoroughgoing organizational network is a necessary condition 
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of class consciousness and behavior, for the latter varies with, and follows the destiny 
of, the organization” (Sartori 1990: 168). Hypothetically, if the 1980 elections results 
in Peru show that communes where communist votes outweigh the APRA are 
identified as those regions in which the communists were the first to establish the 
“apparatus mass party”, then the success of communists could be “found to coincide 
systematically with the occupancy of an organizational void, rather than with objective 
conditions of deprivation” (Sartori 1990: 168-169). He continues, “(i)n that case, what 
we really are observing, via class behavior, is the impact of an organizational variable, 
the influence of party and trade union control”. Class conditions are then only a 
“facilitating condition” and the class receives its identity from the party (op.cit.: 169). 
 Knutsen shows that the salience of the economic cleavage on voting behavior 
may be weakened by crossing cleavages (Knutsen 2004). The primary identity at work 
in workers’ party preferences may be religious, regional, or ethnical. The weakening 
of a given cleavage, as the economic, does not necessarily correspond to the effect of 
crossing cleavages’ in the sense of Knutsen. In the Latin American context, patron-
client relations may have considerable influence on voting behaviour, especially in 
rural, backward regions (Roberts 2000: 7; Schedler 2002: 4). A weak effect of the 
economic cleavage when a strong effect is expected may is thus not necessarily an 
indication of the effect of crossing cleavages, but may be explained by other, non-
structural factors. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
According to Lipset and Rokkan, the salience of the particular social structure 
resulting from industrialization, i.e. the economic cleavage, is manifest if workers’ 
vote for the left is above the national average. They also argue that the salience of the 
economic cleavage is determined by the size of the worker class; left voting increase 
when the proportion of industry workers increase in comparison to other occupational 
classes. However, as Bartolini and Sartori argue, the fact that workers vote for left 
parties does not confirm the presence of an economic cleavage. 
Lafferty argues that the relationship between social structure and voting 
behavior is more complex than Lipset and Rokkan’s model. The crucial factor in 
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explaining variation in the impact of social structure on voting behavior is the 
character of local community contexts. Workers in mono-industrial, relatively 
backward and poor regions are expected to vote for communist parties, while workers 
in more prosperous regions with diversified industry are expected to vote for social 
democratic parties. Sartori warns though that a relationship between structural 
conditions and voting behavior not necessarily strengthens a hypothesis of class 
effects. It is necessary to control for other variables, such as the influence of 
organizations on voting. 
Knutsen adds further theoretical complexity to the relationship between social 
structure and voting behavior; the expected effect of social structure on voting 
behavior may be altered due to crossing cleavages. Workers may thus vote for 
religious or regional political parties, rather than left parties. However, weakening of 
the impact of the economic cleavage may be attributed to non-cleavage factors, such as 
patron-client relationships.  
Theories on specific Latin American contexts are divided in two groups, one 
arguing that cleavage theories are futile due to different historical and cultural 
characteristics between the Latin American and European electorates and party system 
formations; the other arguing that cleavages do have clear effects on voting behavior. 
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2. Sources, data, and methodology  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents definitions of key concepts and operationalizations of the 
hypotheses derived from theories in Chapter 1. A presentation and discussion of the 
methods applied in this thesis close the Chapter. These include on one side Gary 
King’s software EzI3 and his method of ecological inference and on the other side Luc 
Anselin’s GeoDa4 for spatial statistical analysis. 
 
2.2 Defining cleavage, parties included, a definition of verzuiling, and a note on 
occupational categories 
Bartolini’s cleavage definition goes beyond Lipset and Rokkan in the sense that 
it accounts more specifically for the linkage and the mutually reinforcing process 
between the actors in the formation of the economic cleavage: 
 
“…(T)he concept of cleavage can be seen to incorporate three dimensions: an empirical 
element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept and which we can define in 
sociostructural terms; a normative element, that is, the set of values and beliefs that provides a 
sense of identity and role to the empirical element and reflects the self-awareness of the social 
group(s) involved; and an organizational behavioral element, that is, the set of individual 
interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, that develop, as part of 
the cleavage” (Bartolini 2000: 17). 
 
Bartolini suggest that the concept of cleavage should be “restricted to the indication of 
a dividing line in a polity that refers to and combines all three aspects, and alternative 
terms should be adopted when referring to objective social distinctions or to 
ideological, political , and organizational divisions per se” (Bartolini 2000: 17). An 
economic cleavage is thus the result of the mutual reinforcement of these three 
elements. A cleavage may then “be considered as only one particular kind of division 
rather than as a concept that exhausts the realm of all possible divisions” (ibid.). 
The definition of “left” parties in this thesis is anchored in the “set of ideas and 
political and social organizations stemming from the Industrial Revolution: socialism” 
                                                 
3 http://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml 
4 http://www.csiss.org/clearinghouse/GeoDa/ 
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(Bartonlini 2000: 10). This definition is “a historical identification of the left with no 
ambition to being a theoretical definition” (ibid.). This pragmatic conceptualization of 
“left parties” should underline its use as “a meaningful term of reference for long-term 
electoral changes… sub[summing] the three elements of the social constituency 
(support), the ideological orientation (appeal), and the organizational structures 
(representation) within the general historical process of class cleavage structuring” 
(Bartolini 2000: 11). In addition, these parties also share the characteristics of being 
part of “the genetic process of lower-class enfranchisement and early political 
mobilization; they had and have maintained closer contact with the trade unions than 
any other political family” (ibid.). 
The left parties in Peru include on one hand the two left parties that were 
founded during the early phase of industrialization in Peru, the Partido Comunista, and 
the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). On the other, parties founded 
during the 1960s: the New Marxist left that surged after splits in the two original left 
parties, Maoists and Trotskists from the Partido Comunista, and Guevarists and other 
minor ideological groups from APRA (Roncagliolo 1980: 87; Lynch 1999: 137).  
In this thesis, APRA is included in the left party family because the party may 
have represented the moderate left option among workers. However, this inclusion is 
not extent of problems. Stein highlights APRA’s populist character, arguing that in the 
1930s, the party “did not appeal to voters using specific issues or ideology” and “cut 
across class and status lines to include individuals from various levels of Peruvian 
society” (Stein 1999: 99). He continues pointing to the party’s constituency, consisting 
both of “large segments of working-class voters … mainly from the upper reaches of 
the working class – those more organized and unionized – as well as from the ranks of 
middle-class voters” (Stein 1999: 102).  Stein’s account of the paths to populism in 
Peru starts in the 1930s and ends with Fujimori’s government in the 1990s. However, 
an analysis of APRA’s ideological profile, location in the political space, and 
structural composition of its constituency between the 1930s and 1985 is absent. A 
broad social constituency does not disqualify APRA as a left party: “whenever leftist 
parties are successful in mobilizing large electoral support from anyone else they 
suffer a loss of opportunities among narrowly defined workers” (Przeworski and 
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Sprague 1986: 60). Planas classify APRA as a mass party and a social democratic 
center-left party at the time of the 1980 elections, emphasizing the radical leftist 
discourse of the new party leadership that succeeded party founder Haya de la Torre 
after his death in 1979 (2000: 204-207)5. However, he classifies the APRA as a center-
right party in the period 1967-1968 (Planas 2000: 123-125). Tuesta Soldevilla (1989: 
38) locates APRA in the political center in 1980, and Coppedge, informed by country 
experts, also places APRA in the center-left political space6 (Coppedge 1997: 38). 
McDonald defines APRA as a “pragmatic, social democratic party of the center-left”, 
opposed to communism, and underlines that although the party “always has been a 
multi-class party, its most dependable sources of electoral support have been 
concentrated in the urban and coastal popular sectors (e.g., sugar workers) and in 
northern departments such as La Libertad and Lambayeque” (MacDonald 1989: 215).  
Since Haya’s convivencia policy in the 1950s, APRA continued during the 
1960s and 1970s to move in a conservative direction. However, by the time of the 
elections in 1980 and after Haya’s death in 1979, Villanueva del Campo, representing 
the center-left faction, challenged and finally won over the centrist Townsend faction. 
The former wanted the party to return to its compromises with the popular 
constituencies, among them important radical labor sectors in the coastal agro-
industrial “solid north” (Planas 2000: 139). This reorientation is stated in APRA’s 
political program for the 1980 elections, which expresses a social democratic ideology 
through keywords as “social justice”, “economic redistribution”, “mixed economy”, 
“anti-imperialism”, “anti-colonialism”, “solidarity with oppressed peoples all over the 
world” (Podesta 1980: 232-245). 
Lastly, the dichotomization of the political space in 1980 into a left and a Right, 
and classifying the communist parties and the APRA as left parties for exploratory 
purposes, rests on the premises of a directional theory of ideology, “based on the idea 
that for most voters issues represent a choice between two sides” (Listhaug et al.: 112). 
                                                 
5 Planas classifies APRA as a center party in the 1978 Constituent Assembly. However, with the death of its founder and 
leader Haya de la Torre in 1979, under the leadership of Villanueva, APRA moved left. Moreover, Planas classifies PPC as a 
center-right party, he locates AP in the center; APRA in the center-left; and defines PSR, FOCEP, UDP, PCP, PRT, as Left 
parties  (Planas 2000: 204-205).  
6 “Parties that stress justice, equality, social mobility, or the complementarity of distribution and accumulation in a way 
inended not to aienate middle- or upper-class voters” (Coppedge 1997: 8). 
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The parties defined as communist parties in this study include orthodox 
communist and New Marxist parties that presented lists in the 1980 election 
(Roncagliolo 1980: 93; Planas 2000: 169; Tuesta Soldevilla: 95). The orthodox 
communists were represented by the electoral front Unidad de Izquierda (UI) that 
included the PCP-Unidad (aligned with the Soviet Union’s international policies) and 
the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR). UI managed the larger parts of the 
centralized union organization Central General de los Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP). 
Frente Obrero, Campesino y Estudiantial del Perú (FOCEP) was also orthodox, 
receiving its most important support in Pasco, but also in Junín and Ayacucho. Lastly, 
the Partido Socialista Peruano (PSP), borne out of the PCP, gained support in the oil 
region in the north. The trotskists included Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabajadores (PRT), with strongholds in Tacna, Puno, Moquegua and Arequipa, the 
Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) and the Partido Obrero Marxista 
Revolucionario (POMR, joint list with the PRT in the 1980 elections) (Sulmont 1980: 
169). The New Marxist left was influenced by experiences and theories produced in 
countries that had raised against imperialism, as Leninism, Maoism, Guevarism, and 
other theories developed in Latin America and the Third World. In the 1980 election, 
these parties joined the Union de Izquierda Revolucionaria (UNIR), receiving strong 
support in Arequipa, Moquegua, Junín, and Ancash). UNIR was formed by Partido 
Comunista del Perú Patria Roja (PCP Patria Roja), Vanguardia Revolucionaria – 
Proletario Comunista and Frente de Liberación Nacional; Partido Comunista del 
Perú (PCP), the Unidad Democrático Popular (UDP, with stronghold among the 
mining workers, in Piura’s coastal and highland regions, the provinces Espinar and 
Chumbivilcas in Cusco, and in the province of Melgar in Puno), the Vanguardia 
Revolucionaria (VR), Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). In addition, 
some minor left parties, as the Acción Popular Socialista, presented lists (Sulmont 
1980: 170). Planas comments that one of the smallest parties participating in the 
elections in 1980 was the Partido Socialista del Perú (PSP). Its constituency was 
mainly in the northern region of Piura and the party did not present electoral lists in 15 
departamentos. The other political parties were of national, relatively permanent 
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character, organized for electoral participation, and had a centralized party 
organization and a member base (Planas 2000: 35). 
However, Bartolini’s warning has to be taken in mind: “Grouping all these 
parties since the end of the nineteenth century into one category such as the “class left” 
on the assumption that they all represent and hinge on the class cleavage, is a daring 
task from ideological, political, and social points of view” (Bartolini 2000: 10). In this 
thesis, the only party for which a critical review of its “hinge on the class cleavage” 
will be done is APRA. There is not space for a revision of the communist or New 
Marxist parties. 
The concept of verzuiling is defined in accordance with Rokkan in order to 
assess “the degree of interlocking between cleavage-specific organizations active in 
the corporate channel and party organizations mobilizing for electoral action” (Rokkan 
1988: 142). 
The terms “industry workers”, “workers”, “working class”, and “labor” are used 
interchangeably in this study, and refers to the 1981 census classification of “manual 
workers in the industry sector”. This occupational class includes workers in mining, 
agro-industry, metallurgy, textile industry, metal-mechanic industry, petroleum, and 
chemical industry, in addition to vehicle drivers in the industry sector)7. This 
classification of manual labor is to a high degree in accordance with Alford (1963).  
The census classification discriminates between the occupational classes 
”workers in the primary sector” and ”workers in the industry sector”. However, the 
amount of workers in the primary sector shows such high numbers that it is most likely 
that the variable also include small agricultural proprietors8. Analysis of the 
geographical distribution of the variable strengthens the supposition; there are high 
frequencies of ”workers in primary sector” in areas without agro-industry or large 
farms, as in the oriental hillsides of the Andean highlands. The variable is thus 
                                                 
7 The national census in 1981 contains two variables in which the occupational classes are operationalized in different 
manners. It would be desireable to use data from both variables in the analysis in order to compare the empirical results for 
both and as such increase the reliability. However, one of the two variables presented very high levels of missing and was not 
included.  
8 Sulmont’s calculations, based on ca. ca. 1 300 000 employed in the category ”workers” (tab. 3.1) against ca. 1 000 000 in 
my own calculations (tab. 5) and based on numbers from the 1981 census data (INEI 1981). Sulmont finds that ca. 18 percent 
are employed in construction, industry and mining, in other words ca. 1 000 000 personer (tab. 3.1). This parallels my 
numbers. From this it is reasonable to consider the difference, ca. 300 000 persons, represent waged workers in the primary 
sector. 
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excluded from the analyses as discrimination between agricultural proprietors and free 
labor in the primary sector is impossible.  
 
2.3 Operationalization of the hypotheses 
Two basic implications, testable with available data, are derived from Lipset 
and Rokkan’s cleavage theory. First, industrialization produced an economic cleavage, 
which often had a strong effect on workers party choice. Consequently, the salience of 
the economic cleavage on voting behavior is measured by the extent to which workers 
voted for the left parties. The cleavage theory is strengthened if the following 
hypothesis is confirmed: 
 
H1: The proportion of labor votes to the left parties was above the national 
average. 
 
The second implication of Lipset and Rokkan is that the strength of the movements 
grown out of the economic cleavage depended on a series of factors. Available data 
permit hypothesis testing only with regard to the expectation that the economic 
cleavage’s effect on voting behavior is higher in communes with high proportions of 
industrial workers (as a proxy for the “rising masses of wage-earners” and the size of 
the working unit, i.e. concentration of waged labor). If H2 is confirmed, the cleavage 
theory is strengthened. 
 
H2: The support for left parties was higher in communes with high proportions 
of industry workers. 
 
Tests of H1 and H2 will be repeated for the variables workers’ overall left 
support, and separately for communist and APRA support. H1 is operationalized by 
the construction of a truncated bivariate normal distributed variable (King 1997: 103; 
page 37 below), through a bounded regression of the univariate variable “percent 
industry workers per commune”, on the three univariate variables and in separate 
analyses, percent votes to a) the overall left, b) the communist parties, and c) the 
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APRA, all with data on commune level. The truncated bivariate variable contains the 
estimated beta values for the “proportion of workers who voted for the (combined left, 
communist parties, APRA) per commune”. H1 will first be tested against the average 
value of all communes. If workers’ aggregated left vote is above the national average 
the hypothesis is confirmed, and the theoretical expectation that the economic cleavage 
had effect on industry workers’ voting behavior is strengthened. However, the salience 
of social structure may depend on whether APRA is included in the analysis. The 
hypothesis is therefore tested against the communist parties and the APRA separately.  
H2 is operationalized with the same truncated bivariate variables as in the case 
of the first hypothesis. H2 will be tested against visual assessment of scatter plots for 
the combined left, the communist parties, and APRA. 
Both the communists and APRA competed for labor votes in the 1980 election. 
The expectation from Lafferty’s typology is that radical and moderate political parties 
have different constituencies in the industrial proletariat: communist votes will 
dominate in Type A communities, Social Democrat votes prevail in Type B. A less 
rigorous research strategy, combining both spatial statistical analyses of quantitative 
data and descriptive qualitative data of a rather general character, will lay the ground 
for the testing of hypotheses deduced from Lafferty’s typology. Two hypotheses are 
constructed to test Lafferty’s theory: 
 
H3: Industry workers’ support to the communists was strongest in relatively 
deprived, peripheral, or semi-peripheral regions, dominated by 
extractive, mono-industrial activity. 
 
H4: Industry workers’ support to the Social Democrats was strongest in 
relatively affluent, diversified and modern industrial regions. 
 
H3 and H4 are operationalized in the same way as H1 and H2. The ecological 
estimates will be analyzed with different spatial statistical techniques and the results 
will be presented in maps. The identification of type A and type B regions will be done 
with qualitative census data (INE 1981) and with qualitative data from other sources. 
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The hypotheses will be tested against ecological estimates of workers’ communist and 
APRA support, and qualitative data from the census and from Sulmont (1980) and 
other sources. The research strategy for testing H3 and H4 is less stringent than in the 
case of H1 and H2 and to a larger degree interpretative. 
 
2.4 Sources 
The electoral data are digitalized from original data in the double volume Perú: 
Elecciones Generales 1980, edited by the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (the National 
Electoral Court) (JNE 1980). Selected variables from the national census in 1981 were 
digitalized from data in the census manuals edited by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (National Institute of Statistics) (INE 1981). The Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística e Informática produced the geographical database and the corresponding 
digital map employed in this study (INEI 2001). Sulmont (1980) provides all other 
quantitative data.  
The country specific literature was mainly provided by the libraries at the 
Pontificia Universidad Católica and the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, both in Lima. 
Second hand bookstores in Lima provided some of the older literature. The University 
Library at the University of Oslo and the JSTOR Scholarly Journal database has 
provided the main part of the general literature in this study.  
In October 2005, I interviewed two of Peru’s leading scholars in the field of 
political parties; Dr. Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, former Director of the Oficina 
Nacional de Procesos Electorales (National Office for Electoral Processes), actually 
Professor in Political Sociology at the Pontificia Universidad Católica in Lima, and Dr. 
Martin Tanaka, Director at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP, Institute for 
Peruvian Studies), Lima. I presented the analytical advances that where ready by the 
time of the interviews, including the basic research problems and the cartographic 
presentations of communist support clusters. However, by that time, only the electoral 
data were digitalized; the census data were ready for analysis a couple of weeks later. 
Thus, Tuesta and Tanaka could not comment the results of the final empirical analysis. 
However, both contributed with relevant references. In addition, they agreed upon the 
importance of this study, and recommended its continuation and extension. 
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2.5 Data 
The Peruvian government initiated digital storage of electoral and census data 
in 1995 and 1993, respectively. Consequently, electoral and census data from 1980 
and 1981 had to be digitalized prior to the analyses. The dataset used for the present 
analyses includes electoral and census data for the 1678 Peruvian communes that 
existed in 1980. These data were merged with a geographical database prior to the 
statistical analyses.  
The digitalization of data and the creation of datasets were done manually and 
for all the communes or distritos. I employed an assistant in Lima, Mrs. Patricia 
Arroyo de Castañeda, who did an invaluable job digitalizing the data during the period 
from early February to mid October 20059. 
Electoral data from 1980 are publicly available in a double volume edition in 
the libraries of the Peruvian Congress, the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE, the 
National Electoral Jury) and in private entities such as the Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos and the Pontificia Universidad Católica. The variables in the electoral 
dataset include all the competing political parties in the election in 1980, null and 
blank votes, total number of voters, and the number of voting locals. In addition was a 
separate variable of valid votes constructed (total number of votes minus blank and 
null votes) is calculated. 
Census data from the national census in 1981 are publicly available from the 
library of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI, the National 
Institute of Statistics and Informatics). Over 50 manuals contain the data from the 
1981 national census, including a vast number of variables. The variables digitalized 
for the present research include the following demographic and socioeconomic 
variables for all communes: First, total population 18 years and over and total urban 
and rural population 18 years and over. Second, the occupational classes, all including 
population 15 years and over, a) workers in the primary sector, b) workers in the 
industrial sector, c) professionals/technicians, d) public functionaries and mid-level 
functionaries in the private sector, e) administrative personal, f) commerce and sales, 
                                                 
9 Mrs. Arroyo de Castañeda is a former secretary of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Lima, 
Peru. 
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g) employed in the service sector, and h) non-specific occupations. In addition, one 
variable includes persons seeking work for first time. In total, three demographical and 
eight occupational variables (plus one) are included. Originally, these variables were 
divided into age cohorts of five years, each constituting a separate variable (plus the 
cohorts of 18 and 19 years in the case of the 3 demographic variables). Thus, a number 
of 93 original political, demographical, and occupational variables lay to ground for 
the present dataset. 
The control of the data included as a first step the calculation of percentages10 
of each variable in the election and census datasets. The percentages were then 
summed; units with percentages diverging from 100 were compared to the original 
data manuals in order to identify and correct the error. In those cases were the error 
resided in the original data, the value was registered as missing if the divergence from 
100 percent was large (over 5 %). If the divergence was minor (under 5 %), the 
variable was left intact. There is therefore an inherent margin of error11 in the database, 
especially in the variables of urban and rural population. The shortage of time made a 
throughout evaluation of these two variables impossible, consequently, they have to be 
“washed” before use in future analyses12. However, the remaining data are of a very 
good quality and highly reliable. A third person controlled that all the digitalized data 
were correctly digitalized from the original sources during the punching. The values of 
each and one of the variables for all communes were checked. In addition, a random 
sample of about 10 percent of the communes has been compared, variable by variable, 
with original data.  
The geographical database and the digital map from 2001 are produced by the 
INEI13 and contain 1827 communes as the smallest political-administrative unit. A six-
digit identification number codifies each commune, indicating its geographical 
location (Ubicación Geográfica, UBIGEO). The two first digits of the code identifies 
the departamento, the next two the provincia, and the last two the distrito. Thus, the 
                                                 
10 In the case of the political party variables the percentage is based on total valid votes, the census variables’ percentages are 
calculated from total population 18 years and over and total economically active population, respectively 
11 There are some divergences between the official election results and the averages calculated in the digitalized 
electoral data set: APRA: 27,4 % (off. result), 27,78 (digital data set); Communist parties: 14,4 % (off. result), 
14,83 (digital data set). 
12 This dataset will be used in future research on the subsequent elections during the 1980s and 1990s in Peru. Datasets for 
the elections in 1985 (partially done) and 2001 (finished) will be merged with census data from 1993. 
13 www.inei.gob.pe  
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UBIGEO 021804 identifies the departamento of Ancash, the provincia of Corongo, 
and the distrito of Yanac. The geographical position of each distrito, using the cities or 
towns where the administrative center of each distrito is located as centroids, is 
defined by latitude and longitude (Datum WGS 1984, units with decimal degrees)14. 
The polygons are proportional and with geographic form15. The 1827 distritos in the 
geographic database are not organized in descending order; the geographical 
coordinates define the position of each distrito. This in turn means that election and 
census data for each distrito had to be plotted manually into the corresponding distrito 
in the geographical database. This was a very time consuming task, but permitted a 
throughout control of the data during the merging of the three data sets. 
The digital map database includes 1828 communes. 1682 of these communes 
existed at the time of the elections in 1980, 63 were created between 1981 and 2001. 
Of the 1682 communes that existed in 1980 do 83 present missing electoral or census 
values, or both. Missing values may reduce the reliability of spatial statistical 
estimations. When data are presented in the digital map, the communes created after 
1980 will appear as zero-values. The elimination of these communes is not possible 
due to the particular functioning of the software used for the analyses. However, the 
problem is minor in the case of simple descriptive analyses. It may be more 
challenging when testing for Local Indicators of Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA). In 
this case, the existence of communes with zero-values within a cluster of high value 
neighbors may sub estimate spatial autocorrelation. However, a visual inspection of 
the clusters of communes with high percentages of communist and APRA vote show 
very low interference of communes with missing values. In the non-map based 
statistical and spatial statistical analyses with EzI, GeoDa, and SPSS are missing 
values excluded; in consequence, averages for the electoral results may diverge 
somewhat from the official results. Missing values in GeoDa may be excluded when 
calculating Moran’s I through a selection tool16 that permits the codification of 
missing values.  
                                                 
14 Documentation contained in INEI’s digital map. For more information, contact INEI (http://www.inei.gob.pe). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Use the command ”exclude selected” in combination with the ”linking” function (Anselin 2005: 56). 
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The problem of missing values represented by communes created after 1980 
cannot be resolved in any simple way. The only solution would be to modify the 
digital map in order to rearrange the border structure of the distritos to reflect the 
situation in 1980. I ordered information about the 1980 commune structure from the 
INEI in October 2005, asking for the geographical identification number, the year of 
creation, and the geographical coordinates for each of the communes created after 
1980, precisely for the reconstruction of the 1980 structure. However, except for a 
summary of the names of the communes, additional data were not available. Data 
exist, but are not centralized; collecting the data at this stage would be too time 
consuming and costly, but will be done in the future.  
A minor reliability problem is attached to the two diverging census-defined 
lowest age limits in respectively the occupational class variables, which is 15 years 
and more, and the right to vote in the election, in 1980 lowered from 21 to 18 years 
and more. A pragmatic compromise was done by estimating that the proportion of 
workers in the age cohort 15-18 years is similar to the proportion of voters in the age 
cohort of 18 years. This will necessarily lead to less precision in the estimates, but is at 
the same time necessary in order to do the analyses. 
 
2.6 Methodology 
2.6.1 King’s model for ecological inference 
The classical problem of ecological inference resides in the incorrect 
conclusions that are drawn when data on aggregate level are used to infer about 
individual behavior (Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Robinson 1950; Duncan and Davis 
1953; Goodman 1959; King 2003). King’s model for ecological inference provides a 
solution to this problem, using the information that exists in the aggregated values to 
estimate values at the individual level. The method has gained a great deal of attention 
in political science since it was first introduced and is now fairly well known to 
political scientists (O’Loughlin 2000: 2). However, the method has only recently been 
combined with spatial analysis (O’Loughlin 2002: 817). 
                                                 
17 On the internet, a short and a long version of the paper are available. This page annotation refers to the short 
version (http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/ PEC/johno/pub/ nazi_ pa.pdf). Everywhere else in this thesis, the long 
version is used when referring to O’Loughlin (2002). 
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In the absence of survey data, the only quantitative data source for the analysis 
of voting behavior in the Peruvian 1980 elections is aggregate statistics. Three 
aggregate key variables – the estimated overall left vote and the separate estimation of 
respectively communist and APRA vote among industry workers – are examined in 
this study. The estimates are then mapped and analyzed with spatial statistical 
methods18.  
The goal in King’s model is to infer from the marginals to the cells (tab. 2.1), 
employing the variables proportion of votes to the left parties19 (Ti), the proportion of 
industry workers (Xi) in each commune i (i=1,…, p), and total economically active 
population 18 years and more (Ni). The sums of interest, but that are unknown because 
elections are secret, are the proportions of industry workers who voted for the left 
parties (βbi) and the proportion of other occupational classes who voted for the left 
(βwi): 
 
Tab. 2.1: The problem of ecological inference at commune level. The goal is to infer from the marginal 
distributions to the cells (method of bounds). Source: King 1997: 14. 
 
Class left parties 
Other 
parties Total 
Industry 
workers ? ? 3500 
Other ? ? 4500 
Total 2500 4500 8000 
 
 
Tab. 2.2: Items in each cell refers to the absolute number of persons in the various variables. The marginals 
are observed values of the sums of the non-observable elements in respectively row or column. Source: King 
1997: 29. 
 
Votes Class 
 left 
parties 
Other 
parties 
  
  
Industry  
workers Ni
bD NibR Nib 
Others NiwD NiwR Niw 
  NiD  NiR          Ni 
 
  
                                                 
18 For examples on the combination of King’s method and spatial statistical analyses, see O’Loughlin (1999, 
2002) on voting behavior in Weimar Germany in the 1930s. Also King et al. (2004) on nazi support in the 1930s 
in the Weimar republique. 
19 Separate analyses are done for overall Left, Communist, and APRA support. 
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The table 2.2 describes one commune in a dataset with k communes. The table 
shows the variables included in the model for the election in 1980: Industry workers 
who voted for left parties (NibD), workers in industry who voted for other parties (NibR), 
other occupational classes who voted for the left parties (NiwD) and finally other 
occupational classes who voted for other parties (NiwR). 
Table 2.3 shows the elements from table 2.2 as proportions in the first two 
columns. The values in the cells are the proportions of industry workers and the other 
occupational classes that voted for the left parties and other parties (λbi and λwi). In the 
rightmost column the estimates are presented; the beta values (βbi ) and (βwi) for how 
many industry workers versus other occupations that voted for the left.  
 
Tab. 2.3: Estimated proportions of industry workers and other classes who voted for the left. 
Source: King 1997: 30. 
 
Class left parties 
Other 
parties
Prop. 
left 
votes 
Industry 
workers λ
b
i 1-λbi βbi 
Other λwi 1-λwi βwi 
                                                         Ti 
 
 
The development of the model starts with identifying X, on which everything 
depends. Then, the model estimates the βbi and βwi from a truncated20 normal, followed 
by the estimation of Ti, computed via the accounting identity deterministically 
(illustrated with an example the 1980 election data, the commune of Huanza, province 
of Huarochiri, in the departamento of Lima, with geographical identification number 
indicated with subscript): 
                                                 
20 The relationship between the two variables is defined by a bivariate normal distribution with its tails truncated 
at the deterministic bounds. “If the underlying patterns of variability associated with the bivariate normal (BN) 
distribution are such that values below or above some points are not possible (i.e., are truncated or censored), 
then the resulting distribution is, in reality, a bivariate truncated normal (BTN) distribution. Specifically, we 
assume that the otherwise normally distributed random variable x1 is truncated (unobservable) at values below a 
lower limit xL1 and that the otherwise normally distributed random variable x2 is truncated at values below a 
lower limit xL2” (Johnson 2003: 2). 
 
 
 33
 
Ti = βwi + (βbi - βwi)Xi 
 
For the unknowns: 
βwi = 1 1
i i
i i
T X
X X
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  β
b
i 
 βwi = 
0.223 0.561
1 0.561 1 0.561
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  = β
b
i 
      = .398 – 1.277βb150708 = .398 – 1.277βb150708(0.1) = .847 
 
Ti = βbi Xi + βwi (1 - Xi) 
 
 The random variable is then T (given X), which is truncated bivariate 
normal distributed. A distribution of the bivariate truncated variable shows where most 
of the values of βbi and βwi are located. The distribution permits correlation of the 
estimates between - 1 to 1. The formula of the probability density of (βbi , βwi) is: 
 
P(βbi , βwi) = TN(βbi , βwi │B, ∑) 
 
where TN is the truncated normal distribution with truncation limits Bbi∈[0,1] and βwi 
∈[0,1]. From simulations of these parameters, the quantities of interest, βbi, βwi are 
computed. The maximum likelihood function (two averages, two standard deviations, 
and one correlation coefficient), as shown above, estimates the distribution (King 
1997: 132-140). The parameters are then transformed and rescaled. Values from these 
parameters are subtracted from the residual distributions through an importance 
sampling. The averages of the distributions of βwi and βbi are used as point estimates 
and the standard errors and confidence limits are based on selected percentiles of the 
simulated values. This is a great advantage in comparison to earlier models that could 
not give precise levels of confidence in the estimates (King 1997: 58-73).  
Tomography plots generated by EzI present a visual version of the likelihood of 
βwi and βbi, in which each line represent a commune (fig. 4.8 - 4.10, page 63 below). 
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The truncated bivariate normal distribution helps discover an area in the plot where the 
majority of the lines are crossing each other. The true value of βbi ανδ βwi has to be 
somewhere along the line. The red lines traces 95 % confidence bounds and indicate 
the extent of uncertainty in the estimates.  
King adds three assumptions to the model. First, that βbi and βwi are bivariate 
truncated: “(I)nstead of assuming these parameters are constant over precincts (as in 
Goodman’s regression model, we only assume, roughly speaking, that they have 
something in common – that they vary but are at least partly dependent upon one 
another. This distribution has a single mode, indicating where most values of βbi and 
βwi lies, and also allows any degree of variation in each around the model” (King 1997: 
93). Second, the absence of aggregate bias, i.e. “that βbi and βwi are “mean 
independent” of Xi, which is a weaker assumption than requiring βbi and βwi to be 
stochastically” (that is, completely unrelated)”. “This assumption … is technically 
necessary to obtain consistent estimates of B and Σ. However, and somewhat 
surprisingly, this assumption is not always necessary to obtain accurate estimates of 
the quantities of interest” (op.cit. 94). Third, the absence of spatial autocorrelation, i.e. 
that values of Ti in different precincts are independent after conditioning on Xi. … 
(V)iolating this assumption does not have major consequences” (King 1997: 92-94).  
 
2.6.2 Critique of King’s method 
2.6.2.1 Problematic substantial results 
Cho and Gaines argue that ecological inference may be a reasonable research 
strategy, but recommend “extreme caution during both analysis and interpretation” and 
that “at minimum, three conditions are necessary (but far from sufficient)” in order to 
proceed with the estimations (Cho and Gaines 2004: 153). The first condition to be 
met is that “data should appear to be amenable to ecological inference, i.e., there 
should be evidence that the aggregate data are “informative” about the micro level 
process”. Second, there should be “some evidence that the aggregation process did not 
introduce bias that is not modeled”. Third, “one should have a good micro theory and 
an explicit understanding of how that micro theory should be related to the observed 
macro data” (Cho and Gaines 2004: 153, original emphasis).  
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Firstly, data are “informative” when the bounded parameters are sufficiently 
narrow. EzI provides tomography plots of the estimated quantities in order to assess 
the deterministic information in the data. If the bounds are too wide, they will not yield 
any parametric information and the first condition is violated (Cho and Gaines 2004: 
154-155). In addition, and related to the parametric nature of the bounds, the 
tomography plots do also provide information in order to assess the form of the 
underlying distribution by identifying the intersection of βb and βw.  The distributional 
assumption is important both for estimating means and for the computation of standard 
errors (Cho and Gaines 2004: 155). However, “deciding whether a tomography plot is 
informative is something of an art, no one has devised a concrete measure for 
“informativeness” or any formal test for accepting or rejecting the (truncated bivariate 
normal) distributional assumption…” (Cho and Gaines 2004: 155). On the other side, a 
tomography presenting an uninformative plot with wide bounds does not necessarily 
point to an underlying non-normal truncated bivariate distribution (Cho and Gaines 
2004: 155). Due to the lack of useful deterministic information in the truncated data, 
we may simply not be able to decide the real form. On the other side, distributional 
misspecification has proven not to affect the model if the assumptions of spatial 
autocorrelation and aggregate bias hold (Cho 1998: 146). 
Secondly, the condition of aggregation bias is met if the parameters βb and βw 
are uncorrelated with the regressor, the X variable. However, observes that the 
tomography is not very useful in order to detect bias because there are so many 
possible scatters of βb and βw (Cho 1998: 159). King argues that that his model is 
robust also in case of aggregation bias. This is challenged by both Cho (1998: 148-
149) and Cho and Gaines (2004: 159), who criticize King’s definition of “robustness” 
– that EI is robust because the model will never estimate parameters outside the [0, 1] 
bounds (King 1997: 177, 182). This may be the case, “(b)ut estimates constrained to 
respect bounds need not to be close to the truth, or even within a few standard errors of 
the actual values” (Cho and Gaines 2004: 159). Further, “when regressors are 
correlated with parameters, the estimates from EI are not equal to their respective 
population parameters, in expectation, and the discrepancy between the estimates and 
the true values do not converge in distribution to zero as the sample of data points 
 36
become large” (Cho and Gaines 2004: 159). This also produces inaccuracy in the 
estimation of the standard errors (ibid.).  
Thirdly, the estimators resulting from the ecological inference should be micro 
theoretical plausible: “(M)odels that provide a good fit to the aggregate data may not 
provide an accurate portrayal of the underlying individual-level behavior. Indeed, this 
is the ecological fallacy – that what appears to be the case among macrounits may be 
vastly misleading with regard to the microunits” (Cho and Gaines 2004: 160).  
The next crucial point in the assessment of the model is the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation. The model is conditioned on the absence of spatial autocorrelation 
(Ti│Xi). Achen and Shively argue that the problem of aggregation bias is closely 
connected to that of spatial autocorrelation: “Different constituencies will exhibit 
different loyalty and defection rates, and it is only by quirk that these differences will 
fail to correlate with the aggregate independent variable” (Achen and Shively 1995: 
106). Resembling Cho and Gaines above, Achen and Shively argue that in order to 
deal with “the mean disturbances” resulting from aggregation bias and spatial 
autocorrelation the solution “is strong substantive knowledge of how individuals group 
themselves into constituencies and how best one might control for the resulting 
differences in mean disturbances” (Achen and Shively 1995: 114). Anselin and Cho 
argue that the main consequence of violations of the assumption of spatial 
autocorrelation is that the resulting effect may cause problems for proper inference, 
mainly as a loss of precision in the resulting estimators (Anselin and Cho 2002: 296). 
 
2.6.2.2 Methodological inconsistence 
Herron and Shotts points to possible logical inconsistency when the estimates 
from King’s ecological inference model are used as dependent variables in a second-
stage linear regression (King 1997: 279). The assumptions in the first stage of this 
two-stage procedure may contradict the assumptions in the second stage. In other 
words, the ecological inference model assumes absence of aggregation bias, while the 
opposite is assumed in the EzI based regression model. If the EzI estimate based 
regression is inconsistent, the estimates have no known properties, and the standard 
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errors will be meaningless because they are grounded on logically inconsistent sets of 
assumptions (Herron and Shotts 2003: 3).  
Finally, commenting on the usefulness of the method of bounds, Achen and 
Shively argue that it is a rather crude technique compared with covariance-based 
estimates. “(T)he range of error indicated in the mean error of estimate, for instance, is 
generally large compared with what we would expect from covariance-based 
estimates”. Further, the probably “ most troubling aspect of bounds methods to users – 
bounds estimates are not embedded in a structure of statistical theory that allow us to 
assess them against probability distributions (Achen and Shively 1995: 209). 
 
2.6.3 Spatial statistical analyses 
It is expected that industry workers’ voting behavior vary geographically, 
mainly due to the existence of mining and agro-industrial enclaves in the peripheries 
(Planas 2000: 152). This sub-national variation is not captured by national level 
averages. In order to identify geographical clustering of left supporting workers, 
spatial statistical methods are employed. According to King: 
 
“… (w)e need political geography because political scientists don’t understand enough about 
politics. Political scientists need political geographers because they are skillful at pointing out 
what we do not understand. Geographical tools are essential for displaying areal variation in 
what we know, but this is nowhere near as powerful as the role of geography in revealing 
features of data and the political world that we would nor otherwise have considered.” (King 
1996: 161).  
 
While King argues that spatial analysis is necessary only if relevant quantitative data 
do not exist, geographers as Agnew (1996) in contrast holds that: 
 
“(t)he concept of geographical context can be used to draw attention to the spatial situatedness 
of human action in contrast to the non-spatial sorting of people out into categories based on 
census and other classification schemes that inspires most conventional social science. The 
categorical approach suffers from a sort of ‘agnosia‘ or disorder of perception in which 
representations of space only set boundaries for nonspatial processes. Space is thereafter 
eliminated from theoretical consideration” (Agnew 1996: 131).   
 
This discussion will not be further commented. The quotations are included in order to 
highlight the importance of spatial analysis in this investigation due to the absence of 
relevant survey and census data.  
 38
Spatial analysis is useful for data exploration and hypothesis testing in this 
particular study due to various factors. The use of conventional regression models is 
problematic. First, the explanatory value of the (few available) structural variables 
may be limited due to the nature of the dependent variables, i.e. the estimates resulting 
from ecological inference. The underlying form of the dependent variables’ 
distribution may be very difficult to identify (Cho and Gaines 2004: 155, 157). Even in 
the best case, if the dependent variable is bivariate normal distributed, the estimated 
proportions are truncated between 0 and 1. In addition, Herron and Shotts points to the 
methodological inconsistency between the assumptions of zero spatial autocorrelation 
in King’s model, as opposed to the assumption of the existence of spatial 
autocorrelation in a second-stage regression analysis (Herron and Shotts 2003). The 
use of logistic regressions is also problematic because of the assumption of spatial 
autocorrelation (cf. Achen and Shively’s argument above). In addition, the uneven 
pace and geographical expansion of industrialization in Peru implies that the use of 
linear models may be directly misguiding. 
In order to overcome these methodological problems, the geographical space is 
provided a central role in the description, exploration and explanation of industry 
workers left party support. Two measures are central in that task: The global spatial 
dependency and the local spatial dependency. Coefficients from respectively Moran’s 
I (global indicator) and Local Indicators of Spatial Association (local indicators) will 
calculate the regional variation in the distribution of the estimates from King’s 
ecological inference model.  
Spatial dependence is measured by how values of a given variable are 
correlated when the variables are located close together and how the correlation 
decreases with distance. Spatial independence exists when the variable is not 
correlated with adjacent spatial units (O’Loughlin 2002: 15). Moran’s I measures the 
correlation between X and X(neighbors) and is calculated by dividing the spatial 
covariance with the total variance in a variable. The resulting values range from -1 to 
1, in which positive values indicate global spatial autocorrelation, i.e. clustering, zero 
values indicate absence of spatial autocorrelation, and negative values points to a 
regular pattern without correlation. Moran’s I is based on the equation: 
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in which wij is an element in a spatial weight matrix W that indicates whether i and j are 
adjacent. The spatial weight matrix has standardized rows, so that the sum of its 
elements is 1; xi is an observation in the location i (expressed as a divergence from the 
observed mean); and So is a normalization factor equal to the sum of all weights (Σi Σj 
wij). The significance of Moran’s I is measured by a standardized normal distributed z 
score, which is calculated by subtracting the theoretical mean from I and divide the 
rest sum with the standard deviation. The correlation coefficients from Moran’s I are 
visualized in scatter plots in GeoDa 0.9.5i21.  
Spatial weights impose structure in terms of what are the “neighbors” for each 
location (Anselin 2005: 1). GeoDa permits the construction of contiguity and distance 
based spatial weights. The former include Rook and Queen criteria, calculating 
respectively 4-way adjacent spatial units at edge only, and 8-way adjacent units at 
edge and points. The latter weight group includes distance band and K-nearest 
neighbors. The former use the XY coordinates to automatically calculate distance 
between points or centroids of polygons. The latter specify the exact number of 
neighbors that a unit should have based on the distance between units. The number, 
e.g. four or six, determines how many neighboring values that will affect the value of 
each unit. K-nearest neighbors is irrespective of the distance between units (Anselin 
2003: 82). 
Rook and Queen weights tend to overestimate spatial autocorrelation, the latter 
more than the former, because of the connectedness structure the weights impose on 
the spatial units. Spatial weights based on a simple distance threshold criterion results 
often in a very unbalanced connectedness structure when large spatial units have 
varying areal size; small units will have many neighbors, large units will have few 
(Anselin 2003: 96). In these cases, weighting with k-Nearest Neighbors is 
recommended. Each spatial unit is analyzed through the nearest e.g. four units, over 
which the spatial means are calculated for the identification of clusters.  
                                                 
21 Utviklet av Luc Anselin ved Spatial Analysis Laboratory ved Institutt for Geografi, University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign. GeoDa er offentlig tilgjenglig på https://geoda.uiuc.edu/downloadin.php  
I = (N/So) i j wij xi xj / i xi2  
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 In addition to Moran’s I as a measure of global spatial autocorrelation, eventual 
clusters of left party supporting workers will be identified with Local Indicators of 
Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA), based on Moran’s I. The LISA statistics gives a 
measure of spatial autocorrelation in the case of each individual locality, in this study 
communes. The correlation coefficients have to be interpreted with caution; they tend 
to be overestimated. Areas with higher concentrations of the analyzed phenomenon are 
assigned a larger weight in the calculation of the models and will overestimate the 
precision in the estimates. Usually, there are less independent observations than what 
is estimated in the model (Anselin et al. 2004: 30).  
Finally, a comment on some reliability problems related to the mapping of the 
variables. In the digital map database, all the 1827 communes that existed by the time 
of the production of the digital map in 2001 are included, whereas in the EzI analyses 
only those communes that existed at the time of the 1980 election are included. GeoDa 
does not permit exclusion of missing values; there was no alternative but to include all 
the 1827 communes. This distorts the results of the analyses by lowering the averages. 
Therefore, the averages of the beta values that GeoDa visualizes, as in the 
geographical distribution of standard deviations, are below their real level. Moreover, 
the lowest standard deviation includes in practice only those communes created after 
1980; these missing units are thereby identified as dark blue units. However, the issue 
is not too problematic; this is not an exercise in high precision statistics – the 
uncertainty in the EzI estimates permits only the identification of broad patterns of 
communist and APRA support among industry workers. However, in the calculation 
of Moran’s I, a command in GeoDa permits the exclusion of missing values, i.e. 
communes created after 1980 (Anselin 2005: 56). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Bartolini’s definition of an economic cleavage underline the importance of the 
linkage and mutual reinforcement of social structure, ideology, and unions/parties. If 
workers’ voting behavior is cleavage based, then it should be possible to trace the 
existence of these three elements in the sectors and/or regions where left voting 
dominated. The effect of social structure on workers’ voting behavior - eventually of 
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the economic cleavage if its consolidation is confirmed by the analyses below - is 
measured by the level of support to the left parties. The inclusion of APRA in the 
analyses of workers’ support to the left parties is important because the party may have 
constituted a moderate socialist alternative, in Lafferty’s sense. The estimates from 
King’s model have to be interpreted with caution: “To a limited extent, one can gauge 
the suitability of EI’s assumptions for the data by the model diagnostics. Hence, the 
model diagnostics should be used every time EI is employed. However, the diagnostics 
are problematic in that they do not always signal deviations from the model even when 
they do exist. Alternatively, the diagnostics sometimes point toward a poor model fit 
when the estimates are actually quite reasonable. In addition, the diagnostics are based 
on visual assessments and substantive beliefs – two elements which can be completely 
random but equally believable across researchers” (Cho 1998: 162, original emphasis). 
The estimates will be analyzed with spatial statistical techniques in order to identify 
geographical clusters of communist and APRA support. 
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3. LABOR AND THE LEFT IN PERU, 1900-1980 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The levels of stratification and complexity increased in the industrial regions in 
Lima and in a few larger cities as modernization of Peru’s economy accelerated from 
the 1940s and onward. However, in the industrial enclaves in the peripheries, 
especially in the Andean highlands, the capitalistic mode of production in the 20th 
century developed through “a late, limited and to a large extent undifferentiated 
process of proletarization” (Cotler 1979: 145). Working conditions were especially 
harsh in the mining enclaves in the highlands; the coastal industrial regions were in 
comparison relatively prosperous and working conditions were better. Labor unions 
and political left parties soon engaged in the politization of economic conflicts in the 
industrialized regions. The brief democratic interludes in a succession of authoritarian 
military governments did not permit an uninterrupted development of organized 
labor’s political struggle; persecution and prohibition of unions and the left parties 
were obstacles in the process. Yet, the continuities in this process strikes as much as 
the interruptions. Six decades after the beginning of organized labor and the left 
parties’ political struggle for workers’ rights, the historical goal was reached: In 1980, 
the workers could finally throw ‘paper stones’22 at its adversaries in the election.  
In his historical analysis of the Peruvian labor movement, Sulmonts argues that 
class-consciousness, also by the late 1970s, was mainly a union phenomenon, and 
although the politization of the economic cleavage had increased since the leftist 
military government in 1968 it had yet not been translated into a political identity and 
into a solid political organization (Sulmont 1980: 179). “The crisis of centralization [of 
organized labor] can’t be explained without having in mind the fact that the process of 
politization of the workers is still stronger tied to the experience of union organization 
and struggle, than to a more political [experience]” (Sulmont 1980: 149, my 
translation). The relation between unions and the communist parties, “between 
spontaneous actions and organized resistance, was characterized by bureaucracy and 
                                                 
22 “Barricades were no longer needed when workers could cast ballots: votes were “pater stones” (Przeworski 
and Prag: 1986). 
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conflicts, which weakened the political parties’ programmatic platforms and paved 
way for individual protagonism in well-known caudillo style and internal divisions” 
(Sulmont 1980: 179).  
Sulmont concludes that the left’s incapacity to centralize the efforts to organize 
the popular sectors is due to the great diversity within these classes and the absence of 
an axis around which the unification would vertebrate. This axis continues to be, 
argues Sulmont, the principal sectors of the mining and metallurgy, metal-mechanic, 
and textile proletariat (Sulmont 1980: 178).  
The following outline of the formation of the economic cleavage in Peru is 
broadly based on Rokkan’s suggestion of the development of  
 
“… a scheme for the analysis of steps in the translation of cleavages into organizational 
structures in which the interaction between workers, their organizations, and the political 
parties were decided by political opportunity and the strategic choices of the mobilizing actors 
during the formation and politization of the economic cleavage (Rokkan 1977: 140) 
 
in which the steps broadly uncover aspects of the path “from some phase of cleavage 
accentuation to the later phases of organizational structuring” (Rokkan 1977: 140). 
 
3.2 Steps in the formation of the economic cleavage 
3.2.1 Early organization of labor and left parties 
The first phase of the formation of an economic cleavage occurred between the 
last decade of the 19th century and until 1930. The modernization process and the 
“initial generation of cleavage lines through macro-processes such as monetization 
and urbanization, industrialization and secularization” (Rokkan 1977: 140) developed 
comparatively late in Peru. The export boom of raw materials during the second half 
of the 19th century enriched the landed elites and the commercial bourgeoisie to the 
extent that industrialization of the economy was postponed (Cotler 2005: 113; Klarén 
2000: 158). However, Chile’s defeat of Peru in the War of the Pacific in 1883 ended 
the export boom. After the war, the state and foreign capital were assigned 
predominant roles in the reactivation and modernization of the economy. By the end 
of the century, industrialization led to the diffusion of a monetized economy and 
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increased urbanization23 (Cotler 2005: 139). The sectors and regions targeted for 
industrialization were mainly the mining industry in the central and southern Andean 
highland, the petroleum industry in the northern Piura area, and sugar production in 
the northern coastal regions of La Libertad, Lambayeque, Cajamarca, and Ancash. In 
addition, cotton production set off in several parts of the northern and southern coast, 
and wool production in the southern Puno region (Cotler 2005: 141-144). However, 
industrialization in the highlands was postponed due to “the imperialist character of 
foreign capital” and “extensive use of pre-capitalist labor force in the mining 
industry”, which tied the region to the coastal regions in “a complex articulation of 
the capitalist mode of production” (Cotler 2005: 148). 
The labor question became a central theme in Peruvian politics during the first 
two decades of the 20th century and led to the “crystallization of cleavage lines into 
conflicts over public policy and the centralization of political decision-making” 
(Rokkan 1977: 140)24. As the pace and expansion of the process of industrialization 
accelerated, the formation of labor unions and the surge of nationwide political left 
parties that actively engaged in the mobilization of support followed in the 1920s 
(Sulmont 1980: 21). In 1924, Agusto Haya de la Torre founded the Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) as an anti-imperialistic and Indo-American 
political front of manual workers and intellectuals (Cotler 2005: 194). Four years 
later, due to ideological disputes with the Apristas who by then abandoned the “class 
towards class” ideology and approached the middle classes, José Carlos Mariategui 
founded the first communist party in Peru, the Partido Socialista in 1928. Mariategui 
avoided the communist label due to a general atmosphere of intense anti-communism 
in Lima; however, a few years later, the party changed its name to the Partido 
Comunista Peruano (PCP) in 1930 (Sulmont 1980: 48). This tying of labor to the 
political parties on the left expressed an incipient translation of economic conflicts 
into political response. Yet, the formation of an economic cleavage occurred only in 
minor geographic areas where industrialization and modernity had penetrated; the 
                                                 
23 During the first decade of the 20th century were there about 100 000 waged workers in Peru. 21 000 were 
employed in the sugar industry, 10 000 in rice production, 40 000 in the cotton industry, and 20 000 in mining. 
The manufacture employed about 10 000 persons (Cotler 2005: 139). 
24 As an example, Peruvian labor unions’ first great victory, after a series of strikes and severe governmental 
repression, was the eight-hour day in 1919 (Sulmont 1980: 21). 
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overwhelming parts of the Peruvian geography consisted of semi-feudal and pre-
modern rural peripheries where waged labor not yet existed (Cotler 1979: 145).  
 
3.2.2 Repression and persecution 
The next step occurred between 1930 and 1956. The geographical expansion of 
industrialization accelerated and so did the formation of labor unions. The landed 
elites, the commercial bourgeoisie, and the Church demanded the use of state 
repression in order to end workers’ each time more radical demands. In 1932, the 
military government of Sánchez Cerro intensified repression of labor and the 
persecution of members of the APRA and the Partido Comunista (Cotler 2005: 213). 
The development of organized labor was severely restrained and the CGTP would later 
succumb after years of repression and persecution of its leaders and members. The 
PCP suffered the same faith and the party was brought into a prolonged crisis. APRA, 
on the other side, chose a strategy of political moderation in order to avoid the destiny 
of the communists. A new APRA leadership, dominated by the radical petit 
bourgeoisie, moved the party, which by the midst of the 1930s had a hegemonic 
position in the labor movement, in conservative direction (Sulmont 1980: 56).  
The industry boom due to war demands from 1942 and onward augmented the 
proletariat and organized labor gained renewed strength. With the election of the 
Frente Democrático in 1945, repression and persecution of organized labor and the 
left parties was for the time brought to an end (Sulmont 1980: 60). The CGTP had lost 
its organizational infrastructure during the persecution of its leaders during the 1930s; 
the reconstruction of its successor during this period of renovation of labor activism 
resulted in the foundation of the Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP) in 
1943. Initially the communists and APRA shared influences in the union, but in 1945 
APRA took control over the CTP. The agro-export bourgeoisie, led by the political 
Right, soon demanded a clear-cut end to the renewed labor activism during the brief 
democratic interlude initiated in 1945. The leadership of APRA once again turned the 
party in a conservative direction and approached the parties on the political Right in 
order to calm the calls for military intervention. The aprista bases however, more tied 
to organized labor and the popular masses voiced the takeover of political power 
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through popular insurrection and challenged the moderate line of the party leadership. 
A divided APRA could not prevent a military coup d’etat in 1948 and a new period of 
prohibition of the left parties and organized labor (Sulmont 1980: 61-63).  
 The choice of mobilization strategies (Rokkan 1977: 140) differentiated the 
Partido Comunista from APRA, both ideological and organizational. By the 1940s, 
APRA initiated a process of political identity construction that resembles Rokkan’s 
concept of verzuiling25. First, APRA’s political moderation broadened the social bases 
of its constituency. Second, the party used both preexisting organizational networks, 
such as professional associations and labor unions as spheres of influence, and it built 
an extensive network of popular services, providing their supporters with bazaars, 
health services, and educational activities (Stein 1999: 99). The result was a social, 
political and cultural encapsulation of its supporters in order to create and maintain a 
political identity that pervaded a series of aspects of the supporters’ daily life. The 
Partido Comunista, on the other hand, did not engage in any verzuiling; long periods 
of prohibition and persecution from the 1930s and until 1968 obliged the party to work 
in clandestinity.  
 
3.2.3 Industry growth and increased politization 
The choice of arena and the strategy for the confrontation of mobilized 
supporters with political opponents (Rokkan 1977: 140) also differentiated APRA 
from the communists. Towards the 1956 elections, repression against APRA led to the 
party leadership’s separation of a faction that voiced the taking of political power 
through popular insurrection. APRA initiated – in order to regain political influence – 
a period of convivencia, of coexistence and conciliation with the oligarchy by 
supporting the candidates of the political Right in the 1956 elections. APRA gained a 
strong parliamentary representation through the winning candidate Prado’s permission 
of the participation of apristas in his electoral list26, thereby initiating a penetration of 
                                                 
25 As Rokkan states it, “(t)he greater the strength and the stability of such alliances the closer we come to organizational 
verzuiling in the strict sense: an interlocking network of agencies covering a wide range of sectors of collective activity, both 
at the leadership, the recruitment of active members, the mass-level support base” (Rokkan 1977: 143). 
26 Due to general Odría’s ban of APRA, the party did not present candidates to parliament in 1956, but apristas entered the 
lists of Prado, which offered APRA an alliance in change for the party’s support in the 1956 elections (Roncagliolo 1980: 
32).  
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public administration, and the fortification of political and labor activities (Cotler 
2005: 269). 
The democratic opening that the convivencia represented permitted the 
reorganization and revitalization of the Partido Comunista and the strengthening of the 
party’s influence in organized labor. Old labor unions reorganized and the growth of 
new unions was remarkable: In 1955, there were 493, in 1961, the number raised to 
1093, and in 1968, the government recognized 2317 unions (Sulmont 1980: 212-214). 
In addition, a series of legal dispositions led to a stepwise institutionalization of labor 
conflicts and acceptance of labor’s demands. However, the task of organizing labor in 
the mining sectors was difficult due to authoritarianism and paternalism, but in 1959, 
the miners could consolidate their unions after prolonged and difficult struggles 
(Sulmont 1980: 76).  
During the early 1960s, both the pace and the diversification of industrialization 
incremented. In Lima, the assembly and textile industry, chemical, metallic and 
mechanic industry expanded. The fishing boom led to industry growth in major coastal 
cities. Growth in mining activities due to the expansion of foreign investment pushed 
industrialization forward in the Andean highlands. A series of new labor unions surged 
with the expansion of industrial activities and the expansion of waged labor; industrial 
labor expanded from 330 000 in 1961 to 500 000 in 1972 (Sulmont 1980: 186). 
APRA continued to exercise a powerful influence in the unions, particularly in 
the CTP, but the opposition from the communists was strong. APRAs left wing reacted 
to the party’s lack of compromise with the workers and to the party’s moderate 
political stance. The party leadership did not risk the position gained vis-à-vis the 
economic and political power groups due to its convivencia policy. As APRA 
continued its moderate line, resulting in the loss of influence in organized labor. The 
most recalcitrant left wing was therefore expulsed from the party by the early 1960s, 
resulting in the formation of the New Marxist left in Peru, including minor Maoist and 
Trotskist parties (Sulmont 1980: 89). Increased popular mobilization and the 
radicalization of demands both in the cities and in the rural areas opened the way for 
the Marxist left’s influence in unions. Some of the New Marxist left groups abandoned 
the struggle for democratic participation and initiated guerrilla movements, mainly in 
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the southern regions of Peruvian Amazonas and in the southern highlands. These 
armed attempts to mobilize popular support where soon ended due to government 
repression27 (Sulmont 1980: 92). 
 
3.2.4 Breaking up with the past 
After general Velasco’s Coup d’Etat in 1968, a series of reforms were initiated, 
among them a wide-ranging land reform, in order to change the structural bases of 
economical and political power in Peru (Klarén 2000: 340).. Due to the leftist 
character of the military government, negotiations with the CTP were discarded 
because of its lack of prestige and credibility resulting from APRA’s bourgeoisement 
(Sulmont 1980: 101). The military government conceded the CGTP a hegemonic 
position in the representation of organized labor in negotiations with the government, 
both due to pressure from the bases and because the union leadership promised support 
to the government. This was nevertheless a problematic relationship: Quite contrary to 
CGTP’s “class line”, the government’s policy was to “unite capital and workers in 
benefit of production and to stabilize a sector of the workers who was lined with the 
participationism in order to create a counterweight to the class movement” (Sulmont 
1980: 120, my translation). The military leadership during the second phase of the 
Gobierno Revolucionario from 1975 to 1980 abandoned the “revolutionary” goals and 
steered towards liberalization of economy. By 1977, popular discontent with the 
regime increased and the economic crisis deepened. When the government fired 
thousands of union leaders and activists, popular sectors radicalized its political stance 
and organized labor entered a more politicized period. The government considered 
now the CGTP as too radical in its demands and APRA resurged as the solution to 
calm popular pressure. To some degree, the maneuver was successful; APRA aligned 
with the military government and this new alliance acted as a counterforce to the 
popular protests initiated by the Marxist left (Sulmont 1980: 108).  
The golden years of unionism and left party activism during the military 
government were brought to an end by the late 1970s as the economic recession 
affected unionization rates. Huge numbers of workers defected from the unions and 
                                                 
27 However, on the 18th of May, the day of the election in 1980, the Maoist Partido Comunista del Perú–Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path) initiated a prolonged armed insurrection that would last until 1993, with a toll of near 70 000 dead. 
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pursued individual strategies, not collective protests, in order to survive the crisis. 
Sulmont comments that in addition to the general weakening of labor unions due to the 
economic crisis, the majority of worker movements built up during the military 
government were rather spontaneous and active mainly during negative economic 
cycles. By the late 1970s, union strength was notably reduced. Worker’s weak 
identification with the political parties and the profound divisions between the parties 
on the left blocked the revitalization of the unions (Sulmont 1980: 155).  
By 1977, 600 000 workers were affiliated with the APRA-led CTP, mainly in 
the agro-industrial sector. About 950 000 workers were affiliated with the CGTP 
(Marxist), 85 000 with CNT and 80 000 with the CTRP (both pro-government). 
450 000 workers aligned with the Marxist class-confrontational ideology, but were not 
affiliated with a union. Among the most numerous union among the unaffiliated, and 
with interest for this research, was the powerful Federación Nacional de Trabajadores 
de Minas y Metalurgia (National Federation of Mining and Metallurgy Workers). The  
 
Tab. 3.1: The labor force in 1981. Source: INE 1981. 
 
 
nonaffiliated organizations were among the most important and active unions in the 
country and were influenced by New Marxist left parties opposed to the by the Partido 
Comunista, by then perceived of large labor sectors as a conservative and reactionary 
political force (Sulmont 1980: 147). 
 
3.2.5 The left in the 1980 elections 
 
Occupational classes  Absolute           Percent 
Workers, primary sector 2 006 123   35,4 
Workers, industry  1 055 453   18,6 
Professional/technicians     411 236     7,3 
Public employees       24 502        0,4 
Administrative personal     577 681   10,2 
Commerce, sales     566 632   10,0 
Service sector     405 166     7,1 
Non-specified occupations    298 074     5,3 
First-time job seekers     327 369     5,8 
Total  5 672 236              100,1 
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In the election to the Constituent Assembly in 1978 the left parties, including 
APRA, achieved a surprisingly high support; the communists near 30 %, APRA 35 % 
(Tuesta Soldevilla 1994: 156). The results after the elections on the 18th of May 1980 
showed that the combined left had lost a significant proportion of the votes compared 
to 1978; the left received around 14 % of the valid votes, APRA 27 %. This reverse 
was explained by the left’s extreme fragmentation and internal conflicts and APRA’s 
negative legacy as allied to the military government (Sulmont 1980: 176).  
The contours of the pay-offs of the political parties’ strategies, “whether in the 
form of legislation or in other forms of corporate agreements about the distribution of 
rights and obligations” (Rokkan 1977: 140), became visible by the late 1970s. In 1980, 
the Peruvian left reached a historical goal, the 
representation of organized labor’s interests in the 
parliament. The process of translating economic conflicts 
into political response had initiated in the 1920s, involving 
organized labor, the political parties on the left, the 
economic elites, and the state. The numerical manifestation 
of an economic cleavage became visible by the electoral 
support to the left parties in 1980. However, when the 
economic crisis affected the unionization rate by the late 
1970s, support for the left parties declined (Sulmont 1980: 
155). Apparently, the Marxist left had failed to construct a 
political identity among its constituency (Sulmont 1980: 
177). APRA, on the other hand, initiated by the 1940s a 
verzuiling of the party; the hearts and minds of potential apristas in the party’s each 
time broader support bases were to be gained for the cause by providing an extensive 
network of social services, encapsulating the supporters in a kind of aprista 
gemeinschaft. However, the ideological moderation that successfully provided APRA 
with new supporters in the middle classes led to the loss of influence in organized  
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Fig. 3.1 and 3.2: Communist (above) and APRA votes (below), standard deviation of percentages, 1980 
election. Note that communes created after 1980 have zero values, which lowers the averages. Source: JNE 
1980. 
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labor. The Marxist left on the other hand gained influence in the unions due to its 
radical political stance, but not in the broader constituency. 
The geographical distribution of communist votes (fig. 3.1) and APRA votes 
(fig. 3.2) are presented below. The two highest standard deviations of communist 
support are concentrated in the southern Andean highlands: in Puno, in the mountain 
regions of Tacna and Arequipa, and in central Andes in Huancayo, Pasco and the 
mountain regions of Ancash. As for the coast, the highest support for the communist 
parties is comparatively lower than in the highlands and less concentrated 
geographically. Yet, there are concentrations in the northern Piura area, in Chimbote, 
Lima, and Cañete in the center, and Ilo and Tacna in the south. In the case of APRA, 
the concentration of the highest standard deviations are located in “the solid north”, in 
La Libertad, parts of Ancash, Lambayeque, Cajamarca, parts of Amazonas, and parts 
of San Martin. There is also a belt of support in the occidental Andes, in the lower 
parts of the highlands towards the coast. The lowest standard deviations are located in 
the oriental Andes, and in an extensive region in the southern highlands and coastal 
regions. 
 
3.3 Overview of industrialized regions 
The National Census of 1981 provides qualitative descriptive data on the 
location and type of industrial activities in the country’s departamentos (INE 1981). 
Regions with medium and large industrial sectors, measured by the percentage of 
industry workers per commune, were mainly concentrated in some coastal regions and 
in the Andean highlands, the sierra (fig. 3.3. Maps of departamentos and altitudes in 
fig. 3.4 and 3.5 below). Grosso modo, the industrialized regions may be divided in two 
groups28. The first group comprises mono-industrial enclaves in highland peripheries. 
The second group includes the relatively modernized and prosperous industrialized 
regions along the Peruvian coast.  
Region A 1: The large mining regions in southern Andes: Arequipa (Cerro 
Verde and other mines in the provinces of Cayoma, Castilla, Condesuyo); Moquegua 
                                                 
28 The Amazon basin is excluded from the analysis due to the region’s small population and absence of 
significant industry. 
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Fig. 3.3: Industry workers in percent, 1981. Distribution of percentages, standard deviation29. 
Source: INE 1981. 
 
(Cuajone and Quellaveco in the province of Mariscal Nieto); and Tacna (large mines 
in Toquepala). 
Region A 2: Cusco (large mines in the provinces of Chumbivilcas and Espinar, 
minor mining areas and manufacture in Cusco and Quispicachi). 
Region A 3: Junín in central Andes (large mines and important metallurgy 
plants in the provinces of Yauli, Jauja, and Junín). 
Region A 4: The departamento of Pasco in northern central Andes (metal 
extraction in several mines, among the largest in the country, in Pasco province). 
Region A 5: Puno (metal extraction of minor importance, almost 500 industry 
plants, mainly in the process industry of non-metallic minerals and soda water 
production in the provinces of Juliaca, Puno, and Chucuito). 
                                                 
29 The two lowest standard deviations have no values. This is because the values below average are located within the first 
standard deviation below the average values. The values above the average are, on the other hand, located within three 
standard deviations. This is explained by the variable’s normal distribution, which is strongly skewed to the left and with a 
long tail to the right (see fig. 4.1). The variable percent votes to the Left parties have approximately the same normal 
distribution pattern, the absence of values in the two lowest standard deviations have the same explanation. 
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Region A 6: Cajamarca (minor mines in Hualgayoc, Contumaza, Cajabamba). 
The second group includes the relatively prosperous and diversified industrialized 
regions in the coast: 
Region B 1: Lima metropolitan area (metallurgy, metal mechanic, chemical, 
pharmaceutical, and assembly industries in Carabayllo, Puente Piedra, Ventanilla, 
Comas, El Agustino, Ate, San Juan de Miraflores, among others) and the 
departamento of Lima (minor mining activities in the provinces of Huarochiri and the 
sierra region of Huaral and Chancay. Manufacture in the coastal areas of Huaral and 
Chancay). 
Region B 2: Coastal region of Ancash, north of Lima (metallurgy, fishmeal, 
and sugar production in the province of Santa in the coast, minor mining areas in the 
provinces of Bolognesi and Recuay in the highland). 
Region B 3: The agro-industrial northern regions of La Libertad (provinces of 
Trujillo and to a lesser degree Pacasmayo) and Lambayeque (province of Chiclayo).  
Region B 4: The petroleum industry and manufacture sector in the northern 
departamento of Piura (provinces of Talara, Paita, and Piura). 
Region B 5: The southern agro industrial regions of Ica (agro-industry in 
Chincha and Ica, fishing related industry in Pisco, minor mining areas in Nazca) 
The lack of precise data makes the empirical identification of Lafferty’s ideal 
types in the Peruvian geography rather difficult. Only a broad characterization of the 
larger industrialized regions is therefore possible. The categorically stratified 
monotype industrialized communities and corporate competitive disrupted and non-
integrated Type A communities would be common, grosso modo, in the peripheries 
and semi-peripheries in the Central and Southern Andean highlands, i.e. regions A 1 – 
A 6. These industrialized regions are characterized by some degree of urbanization and 
are more complex than surrounding rural agricultural communities due to the existence 
of mining activities, and are stratified along a few occupational classes in layered 
hierarchies. The Andean highlands were the most deprived region economically and 
socially, with high socioeconomic differences between classes, in addition to the 
highest levels of ethnical differences in the country (López Jiménez 1997: 445, 448, 
463). Corporate multitype or pluralist Type B communities were located in the  
 55
MOQUEGUA
AREQUIPA
TACNA
APURIMAC
AYACUCHO
JUNIN
PASCO
CUSCO
AMAZONAS
LAMBAYEQUE
PIURA
LA LIBERTAD
ANCASH
LIMA
ICA
HUANCAVELICA
UCAYALI
HUANUCO
SAN MARTIN
LORETO
TUMBES
CAJAMARCA
MADRE DE DIOS
PUNO
 
 
Fig. 3.4: Map of the Peruvian departamentos. Source: INEI 2001. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5: Overview over coastal and highland regions. Altitude, meters above sea level. Source: INEI 2001. 
 
industrialized coastal regions, i.e. regions B 1 – B 6, especially in the comparatively 
affluent agro industrial sector in the north (López Jiménez 1997: 448, 463). These 
regions had reached higher levels of modernization and the industry sector was 
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diversified, including manufacture, metal-mechanic industry, metallurgy, 
pharmaceutical and chemical industry, assembly and so on (ibid.). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Sulmont argues that class-consciousness in the industry sector by the late 1970s 
and at the time of the elections in 1980 mainly was a union phenomenon, and that the 
most ideologized workers were those in mining and metallurgy, metal-mechanic 
industry, and the textile proletariat. Despite a process of formation that had lasted over 
five decades, an economic cleavage had hardly consolidated. The communist parties 
and the APRA had influenced different sectors in the industry, and there were ties 
between organized labor and the parties. The communist parties had not been capable 
to articulate with organized labor and the workers in such a manner that labor ideology 
had taken root in the masses of wage earners; only minor sectors, especially in mining, 
metallurgy and a few others, had workers developed higher levels of ideological 
convictions. APRA on its side had apparently been more successful through its 
verzuiling process or the encapsulation of supporters through a web of social services 
in order to spread moderate labor ideology and create a party identity. Support to the 
communists was strongest in the central and southern Andes; APRA support was 
strongest in the northern coastal and highland regions. 
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4. Empirical analyses  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter is divided in four parts. First, the distribution of the variables prior 
to the ecological inference is briefly described. Second, descriptive statistics of the 
ecological inferences, i.e. the truncated bivariate variables, are presented in figures and 
tables. Third, the reliability of the ecological estimates is assessed with EzI 
diagnostics. Fourth, in order to identify regularities in the geographical distribution of 
the values, the estimates are analyzed with spatial statistical techniques. 
 
4.2 Labors’ left votes. National averages. 
The normal distribution of “percent industry workers per commune” is strongly 
skewed to the left (mean and median values at 11 % and 6 %); few communes had 
high proportions of workers. The 
variables “percent votes to the communist 
parties” and “percent votes to APRA”, 
are also left-skewed, APRA votes 
somewhat less than communist votes 
(communist mean 14,8 % and median 
11,6 %; APRA mean 27,7 %, median 
21,7 %).  
 
 
Fig. 4..2 and 4.3:  Percent votes to communist parties and APRA per commune. Sources: JNE 1980. 
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The estimates resulting from ecological inference with EzI provides the average 
differences between workers (beta B) and other occupational classes (beta W) with 
respect of overall left, communist, and APRA support are described in tab. 4.1 and in 
fig. 4.4 - 4.6.  
 
Tab. 4.1: Descriptive statistics, beta B and beta W for overall left, communist parties, and the APRA. 
 
1599 1599 1599 1599 1599 1599
0 0 0 0 0 0
,44130 ,424874 ,228276 ,137853 ,265730 ,279111
,42960 ,402800 ,235000 ,099400 ,247200 ,212500
,419a ,3193 ,2122a ,0005 ,2180 ,0005
,104297 ,2004563 ,0592188 ,1257226 ,0886924 ,2171284
,044 ,0144 ,0010 ,0005 ,0015 ,0005
,979 ,9919 ,7004 ,9009 ,8630 ,9811
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Beta B
Left
Beta W
Left
Beta B
Communists
Beta W
Communists
Beta B
APRA
Beta W
APRA
Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is showna. 
 
 
The difference between beta B and W for overall left support is very low. 
Workers’ support to APRA was about 2 percentage points higher than other 
occupational classes. However, the mode value for beta B indicates a higher 
concentration of votes around the average. For communist parties, the difference is 
larger; workers’ support was near 23 %, other classes near 14 %, but with considerably 
lower median and mode values for the latter. APRA received practically the same 
degree of support from workers and other classes, although the median for beta B is 
somewhat higher, and the mode is considerably higher for beta B. The distributions of 
the variables are presented graphically in fig. 4.4 - 4.6. 
The scatter plots in fig. 4.7 – 4.9 display Goodman’s regression line (green) and 
the EzI generated Maximum Likelihood estimation (yellow). The size of the electoral 
population in each commune is identified by a circle - the larger the population, the 
larger the circle. The overall left support scatter plot (fig. 4.7) indicates no correlation 
between the proportion workers and the proportion left votes per commune. In the case 
of the communist parties (fig. 4.8), there is a weak positive correlation between the 
proportion of workers and the proportion of communist votes per commune. The next 
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Fig. 4.4, 4.5, 4.6: Distribution of beta B and beta W: Overall left (first row), APRA (center row), and the 
Communist parties (last row). 
 
scatter plot (fig. 4.13, below) show a slightly weak negative correlation between the 
proportion of workers and the proportion of APRA votes per commune. The scatter 
plots shows, however, considerable variation in industry workers’ voting patterns. The 
national averages may hide as much as they reveals. 
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Fig. 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9: Scatter plots, proportion of 
industry workers and overall left support (left 
above), communist party support (right above) 
and APRA support (below). Goodman’s 
regression line in green, Maximum Likelihood 
estimation in yellow. Red lines are 80 % 
confidence intervals. The circles show the size of 
economical active population 18 years and more 
per commune. 
 
4.3 Assessing the EzI diagnostics 
The parametric information in 
the proportions of industry workers 
and respectively proportion left, 
communist, and APRA votes in each 
commune is informative if the bounds are narrow (King 1997: 79-90). However, the 
bounds of the included variables are too wide to provide useful information (the exact 
bounds for each commune are included in the dataset, available upon request). The 
statistical uncertainty of the EzI estimates is therefore considerable, as seen in the 
tomographies in fig. 4.8 - 4.10. The estimates for each commune are located 
somewhere along the lines in the tomography plot (King 1997: 81). Relatively flat 
lines give narrow bounds on of βiw and wide bounds for of βib, and steep lines indicate 
narrow bounds for βib and wide bounds for βiw (King 1997: 81, 282). In the case of 
overall left party support, the yellow lines indicate a similar distribution of estimates in 
the case of both beta B and beta W, although it appears that APRA support is lower in 
communes with high proportions of workers. In the case of the estimates of communist 
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party support, most of the lines are flat, presenting highest density in the inferior part 
of the space, indicating a generally low communist support in the majority of the 
communes. The APRA estimates cover a wider range, pointing to the existence of a 
higher proportion communes with high APRA support as compared to the proportion 
of communist supporting communes. However, both tomographies are very dense and 
uninformative. The bounds on the beta B and W axis for overall left party support 
covers wide parts of the [0-1] range. Beta B for communist support is projected 
between approximately .01 and .50) and the beta W covers practically the whole range 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10: Tomographies of beta B 
for overall left (above to the left), communist 
parties (above to the right), and APRA (below to 
the left). The red parts of the lines show 95 % 
confidence limits. 
 
between .01 and .90. The beta B and 
W for APRA support are both 
projected between 0.1 and .90. The 
projections are thus too wide to 
provide substantial information. The 
tomographies are also useful for the 
assessment of the underlying distribution of data (King 1997: 124- 132). In neither of 
the tomographies are there clear intersections at a common point, i.e. a common value 
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of βib and βiw. The red contour lines on the graph lines, representing 95% maximum 
likelihood intervals, would, with more informative data, have defined the truncated 
bivariate normal distribution of βib and βiw. Inspection of EzI’s nonparametric tests30 
(not shown here) points to the same pattern as the tomographies: the contours show a 
very large variance in βib and somewhat lower in βiw, for both overall left, communist, 
and APRA support. Consequently, the form of the underlying distribution may or may 
not be truncated bivariate normal, due to the statistical uncertainty in the data, the true 
form cannot be identified. 
 The information available in the tomographies includes also an assessment of 
the variation in Xi. More uncertainty should be added to the results if Xi shows little 
variation, indicated by nearly parallel lines that points to a small range of values (King 
1997: 229, 285, 286). If aggregation bias is absent, there is no correlation between the 
parameters βib and βiw and the regressor, the X variable. Regression analyses with 
SPSS of Xi on βib and βiw give coefficients with zero values in all cases, although 
several coefficients are not statistically significant. A cautious conclusion is therefore 
that aggregation problems are not representing a problem in this case. 
In conclusion, the diagnostics points clearly to a cautious interpretation of the 
estimates. Both the uninformative bounds and the uncertain form of the beta values’ 
underlying distribution do affect the precision in the EzI generated estimates. 
 
4.4 Labor’s left votes. Sub-national variation 
Fig. 4.12 presents the mapping of beta values for communist party support. The 
figure shows a relatively unstructured and heterogeneous spatial structure. The 
communes included in the two highest standard deviations are to a large degree 
located in the southern Andes, in eastern parts of Cusco, the westernmost provinces of 
Arequipa and the sierra of Moquegua and Tacna (regions A 1 and parts of A 2, cf. pp. 
56-58 above). Further, there are scattered high values in Junín and Pasco in the central 
Andes (regions A 3 and A 4), in Piura (region B 4), and Lima (region B 1). A 
concentration of the lowest values is located in the northern coastal region of La 
                                                 
30 Nonparametric density estimation with contour plot and surface plot representation (see also King 1997: 101-
96, 229) 
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Libertad and Lambayeque (B 3), and Cajamarca (A 6). Few clear patterns, with the 
exception of the clusters of high support in regions A 1, A 2, A 3, and A 4, and of low 
support in La Libertad (region B 3), are identified. As already mentioned, the large 
Amazon region is excluded from the analyses due to low population and absence of 
significant industry. GeoDa does not permit zooming with the present map format, 
consequently, Lima metropolitan area is not visible in the map. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.12: Geographical distribution, standard deviation of estimated proportions of industry workers who 
voted for the communist parties (beta B). 
 
The map of APRA support shows much more structured spatial patterns. There 
are clear concentrations in northern La Libertad and Lambayeque, in the sierra of 
Ancash, and in Cajamarca (regions B 2, B 3, and A 6). This large cluster stretches also 
into some provinces of Amazonas and San Martin. Further, an interesting 
homogeneous pattern of relatively high APRA support is uncovered in the western 
regions of the Andes and the coast, beginning in Chancay in the north of the 
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departamento of Lima and continuing to Ica in the south. This is also the case of the 
oriental side of the Andes from Huancavelica and south to Puno. This pattern may 
suggest that APRA support was stronger in the valleys and the lower regions in the 
Andean highland, while weaker in the highest regions of the sierra. In turn, this would 
suggest that APRA support was low in the mining regions, situated in the highest areas  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.13: Geographical distribution, standard deviation of estimated proportions of industry workers who 
voted for APRA (beta B). 
 
of the Andes. These areas of average or relatively high support to APRA are 
contrasted by the low-support triangle in the south, including especially the western 
parts of Cusco (region A 1), Tacna, Arequipa, and Moquegua (region A 1), and Puno 
(A 5). Another region of low APRA support is the central Andes, including Junín 
(region A 3) and Pasco (region A 4). 
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4.5 Spatial analysis of left vote distributions 
In order to uncover geographical clusters in the distribution of left party 
support, spatial analyses of both global and local indicators of spatial autocorrelation 
are employed. Calculations of Moran’s I and LISA are weighted with distance bands. 
K-nearest neighbors could also have been used, but the definition of a specific distance 
band, in this case 40 kilometers, provides more accuracy to the estimations. Thus, 
units that are located further away geographically, identified by measuring the distance 
from each observation to all others in the dataset, are given declining salience. The 
areal size of the spatial units, i.e. the communes, is relatively homogenous, preventing 
that small units will have many neighbors, and large units will have few. The 
exceptions are the large communes in the Amazon rainforest region, but this area is 
excluded from the analysis due to the limited population size and absence of 
significant industry. 
The variables (EzI estimates) are standardized so that the values, both those in 
the Moran’s I graphs and the LISA values mapped with GeoDa, correspond to 
standard deviations. The four quadrants in the graph classify four types of spatial 
autocorrelation, measured with Moran’s I: high-high (above to the right), low-low  
 
 
Fig. 4.14 and 4.15: Moran’s I for beta B communist parties (left) and APRA (right). Communes created after 
1980 are excluded (yellow color). 
 
(below to the left) identifies positive spatial autocorrelation; high-low (below to the 
right) and low-high (above to the left) identifies negative spatial autocorrelation. The 
regression line is Moran’s I and its value is given on the top of the graph. The yellow 
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points along the vertical line to the left in the graphs (fig. 4.14 and 4.15) are 
communes created after 1980 and excluded as missing. Calculation of the Moran’s I 
suggests that there is a weak positive global autocorrelation at approximately .07 in the 
case of communist votes, while APRA votes show a slightly stronger positive value at 
approximately .22. This points to the existence of APRA and communist supporter 
clusters. 
The next step is to identify the geographical location of these clusters. The local 
indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) test identify distinctive regional clusters 
of communes with high beta values for APRA and communist support. Sensitivity 
analyses were done before the clusters were interpreted in the LISA maps. 
Randomization with 999 permutations of the spatial-statistical calculations increases 
the numerical stability in the estimations. The significance filter is defined at p < .05. 
GeoDa permits the significance level to vary between .05 and .001 in order to show 
how conclusions depends on the level of significance, and constitute an informal 
mechanism for the comparison of different estimations (Anselin 2005: 142). 
The largest cluster of communist support is located in the following high-high 
regions (beginning with the largest cluster and moving north): 
 
Cluster A: Region A 1: Eastern parts of Arequipa (Union, Parinacochas, 
Condesuyo, Cailloma, and Castilla); northern parts of Puno (province of 
Lampa). 
Region A 2: Western parts of Cusco (province of Espinar) 
Cluster B: Region A 2: Eastern parts of Cusco (provinces of Chumbivilcas, Paruro, 
Acomayo, Cusco, Urubamba, Canchis, Anta). 
Cluster C:  Region A 3: Junín (Tarma, Yauli, Jauja, Concepción, Huancayo), 
including the highlands in the eastmost parts of Lima sierra (province of 
Yauyos). 
Cluster D:  Region A 4: Pasco (provinces of Pasco, Ambo, Daniel A. Carrión), 
including the highlands in the northernmost parts of Lima sierra 
(province of Chancay).  
Cluster E:  Region B 1: Northern coastal region of Lima (province of Chancay). 
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Cluster F: Region B 4: Piura (provinces of Piura, Talara, Paita and Sullana). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.16: Univariate LISA of beta B communist parties. Weighted with 25 km  distance band (999 
permutations). Units marked with yellow lines are communes created after 1980. 
 
On the other hand, relatively large high-low clusters (communes with high 
values located among communes with low values) are located in the highland 
departamento of Ayacucho, west of Cusco, and in western parts of Cajamarca (region 
A 6, provinces of Contumaza, Cajamarca, and San Miguel), and in some eastern 
provinces in the same departamento (provinces Encañada and Los Baños). In addition, 
some high-low values are located in Lambayeque (region B 3). 
Finally, two distinctive low-low clusters (communes with low values located 
among other communes with low values) are located in i) La Libertad (region B 3, the 
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coastal province of Trujillo and the eastmost sierra province of Bolivar), and in ii) 
Cajamarca (region A 6, provinces of Celendin and Cajabamba). 
The LISA test of APRA support shows high-high clusters in an extensive 
region in the “solid north”, expanding into provinces in the Amazon region: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.17: Univariate LISA of beta B, APRA. Weighted with 25 km distance band (999 permutations). Units 
marked with yellow lines are communes created after 1980. 
 
Cluster I: Region B 3: La Libertad (provinces Huamachuco, Santiago, Pataz, 
Pacasmayo, and Trujillo) and Lambayeque (Chiclayo, Lambayeque). 
Region B 2: Ancash, both coastal and the highland provinces. 
Region A 6: Cajamarca (Cajabamba, Contumaza, San Miguel, Cutervo, 
Chota, Santa Cruz, Jaen, San Ignacio). 
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Region B 4: Piura, parts of the sierra (province of Huancabamba). 
In addition, east of Piura and northeast of Cajamarca: Amazonas (Bagua, 
Chachapoyas, Luya) and San Martin (San Martin, Huallaga, Lamas, and 
Moyobamba). 
Cluster II:  Region B 2: Ancash (province of Casma). 
Cluster III: Region B 1: Northern parts of Lima (Chancay) and Ancash (Bolognesi). 
 
Distinctive low-low clusters are located in the i) eastern part of Ancash 
highlands (Mariscal Castilla, Yungay, and Pomabamba), and along a large belt that 
stretches from ii) Pasco (provinces of Pasco and Daniel A. Carrion) through Huancayo 
(Tarma, Yauli, Junín) and south to Junín (Jauja, Concepción), Huancavelica 
(Huancavelica, Tayacaja, Angaraes, Acombamba) and Ayacucho (La Mar, Lucanas, 
Cangallo, Huamanga, Huanta). Finally, a second belt stretches from iii) Arequipa 
(Islay, Condesuyo, Cailloma, Castilla, Arequipa) through Moquegua (General Sánchez 
Carrion and Mariscal Castilla) and south to Tacna (Tacna and Tarata).  
In order to conclude, clusters of communist supporting industry workers are 
mainly located in a) highland mining regions, and b) coastal general industrial and 
petroleum regions. The APRA supporting industry workers are clustered in the a) 
agro-industrial regions in the coast, in b) the lower non-industrialized highlands in the 
northern sierra, and in c) the western parts of the Amazon region in the north and 
north east. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 The estimates resulting from ecological inference with EzI have to be 
interpreted with caution due to the existence of statistical uncertainty. Both 
uninformative bounds and an unidentified underlying distributional form of the 
truncated bivariate variables affect the precision in the estimates and their level of 
probability. The ecological estimates show that social structure had more effect on 
workers’ vote to the communists than to APRA. Labor support to the communist 
parties increase slightly with increasing proportions of workers. In the case of APRA, 
the opposite is occurring; as the proportion of workers increase, the level of support to 
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APRA diminishes. Broad clusters of communist support are mainly identified in the 
mining regions in the Andean highlands; clusters of APRA support in the coastal agro-
industrial regions in the north, and in the less industrialized northern highlands.  
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5. Discussion: The relevance of social structure in 
the explanation of labor’s voting behavior in 1980 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Chapter briefly discusses the process of cleavage formation in Peru and 
assesses, with qualitative data, its impact on labor’s voting behavior in 1980. Then, 
each of the four hypotheses is tested with results from the empirical analyses. 
Due to statistical uncertainty in the ecological inferences, a cautious 
interpretation of the estimates is imperative. The EzI diagnostics identifies mainly two 
problems: Lack of information in the bounds and lack of specification of the 
underlying distribution of the truncated bivariate variables. The first problem may 
affect the level of precision in the estimates, the second the calculation of probability. 
It is therefore important to assess the results with what is known from qualitative 
evidence. The maps are helpful in evaluating the results, and will be compared with 
what is known about the various geographic regions and serves to identify outliers. 
Although it is impossible to know with certainty the level of precision and the level of 
probability of the ecological inferences, it is reasonable to argue that the estimates do 
point to important tendencies. Paraphrasing Franklin, Mackie, and Valen: in this 
exploratory study, it is more important to be able to build upon the findings, in order to 
reach conclusions of substantive interest and conceptual relevance, than to achieve 
accuracy to the second decimal (Franklin et al. 1992: 23). 
 
5.2 The degree of cleavage formation 
Was labor’s vote to the left in 1980 cleavage based? In accordance with 
Bartolini’s definition and Sulmont’s account of the relationship between workers, 
organized labor, and the political parties by 1980, an economic cleavage was 
apparently not consolidated. Sulmont’s comments on the relation between labor and 
the communist parties are relatively informative; comments on APRA with respect of 
this issue are few and not explained in detail. Other sources, as e.g. Planas (2000), 
Cotler (2005), and Tuesta (1995) consulted in this study do neither provide much 
information. APRA will therefore only briefly be commented. 
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Bartolini’s cleavage definition includes three dimensions, an empirical, a 
normative, and an organizational behavioral element. The empirical element is social 
structure, or social class. Structural conditions for the development of an economic 
cleavage did exist, as outlined above, during the whole 20th century in the 
industrialized regions of the country. The normative element is constituted by “the set 
of values and beliefs that provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical 
element and reflects the self-awareness of the social group(s) involved” (Bartolini 
2000: 17). This “set of values and beliefs” would be labor ideology, 
(socialist/communist ideology), and its function was to create a common subjective 
experience of workers’ location in the objective socioeconomic hierarchy, in other 
words class-consciousness. Sulmont argues that class-consciousness in Peru by the 
late 1970s was “mainly a union phenomenon that not yet had been translated into a 
political identity and into a solid political organization” (Sulmont 1980: 179). The 
third element is the “set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, 
such as political parties, that develop, as part of the cleavage” (Bartolini 2000: 17). 
Labor organizations and political parties developed as part of the cleavage, as outlined 
above, and existed since the 1920s. However, Sulmont argues, referring to the 
communist parties, that “the relation between union and party, between spontaneous 
actions and organized resistance, was characterized by bureaucracy and conflicts, 
which weakened the political parties’ programmatic platforms and paved way for 
individual protagonism in well-known caudillo style and internal divisions” (Sulmont 
1980: 179). In addition, Sulmont explains the left’s incapacity to centralize the efforts 
to organize the popular sectors referring to the great diversity within these classes and 
the absence of an axis around which the unification would vertebrate (Sulmont 1980: 
178). Sulmont does not comment specifically on the character of the linkage between 
unions and APRA, consequently, this element will not be discussed. Bartolini’s first 
and second elements, social structure and ideology, were maybe more intriguing 
aspects of APRA support than the case of the communists. In the case of the latter, it 
appears that the combination of union action and social structure explain the largest 
part of the votes. In the case of APRA, it seems that a third variable had important 
effect. APRA’s verzuiling strategy, especially in the northern regions, may have 
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constructed a relatively solid social democratic political identity among its 
constituencies. Thus, APRA did not depend only on the unions as vehicles for 
political socialization; in addition, the party had woven a web of professional 
associations, educational and health services and so on. Thus, the relation between 
party and unions was not as decisive as in the case of the communists because APRA 
possessed a broad range of vectors for its political identity construction. 
Only tentative conclusions can be drawn due to the lack of data and scarcity of 
sources. In the industrialized regions, objective structural conditions for cleavage 
formation existed, but ideologization of workers and organizational channels that 
linked workers and political parties were generally poorly developed. Cleavage-based 
communist support was mainly, as Sulmont argues, a union phenomenon. However, 
APRA had apparently to a larger extent succeeded in developing ties between the 
party and its labor constituencies through the verzuiling process. However, more data 
and further analyses are required in order to decide whether workers’ support to 
APRA was cleavage based or anchored in other sociocultural mechanisms.  
The results of the quantitative analyses will add further insight into the nature 
of labor’s left vote in 1980.  
 
5.3 National averages 
EzI estimates of workers’ overall left vote in the 1980 election, including 
APRA, do not confirm hypothesis H1. The national average of workers’ votes to the 
left parties was approximately at the same level as the national average, not above. 
However, the result is different when APRA votes are kept out of the analysis. The 
national average of industry workers’ votes to communist parties was almost 23 %, 
presenting a narrow distribution of the votes, whereas the national average of all other 
occupational classes was approximately 14 %, with median and mode values 
considerably lower. In other words, nearly one quarter of the workers voted for the 
communists. On the other side, slightly above one quarter of industry workers’ votes 
were given to APRA. EzI estimates give a national average of 27 %, the same as the 
national average in the election. For beta W, the median was somewhat lower and 
mode values were much lower than beta B. Thus, the distribution of non-worker 
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APRA votes was broader. As already commented above, this points to the 
characterization of APRA as a catch-all party with a broad support base, including 
about 50 % worker votes and 50 % support from other classes. On the other hand, 
more than 60 % of the votes to the communist parties came from the industry workers. 
Support to the communist parties was thus to a larger extent class based. The 
confirmation of H1 depends thus on the inclusion of APRA. H1 is confirmed if only 
the communist parties are considered. 
Hypothesis H2 states that the support for left parties is higher in communes 
with high proportions of industry workers. The expectation is that industrialization 
leads to concentrations of waged labor, and the concentration of individuals who share 
objective socioeconomic conditions and subjective class-consciousness facilitate the 
intervening action of labor unions and left parties. As seen in the scatter plots in fig. 
4.7-4.9, overall left support show no correlation between the proportion of industry 
workers and the proportion left votes. In the case of APRA, the EzI estimates present a 
weak negative correlation between proportion industry workers and proportion APRA 
votes. In other words, the support for APRA tends to decline in communes with large 
proportions of workers. In the case of the communist parties, the regression line shows 
a weak positive correlation between proportion workers and proportion votes to the 
communist parties. The proportion of votes to the left parties increases slightly with 
higher proportions of industry workers per commune. However, in the three scatter 
plots, the confidence interval is quite large for all communes, which imply a cautious 
interpretation. The conclusion - with caution due to the statistical uncertainty - is that 
H2 is strengthened only in the case of communist parties. 
 
5.4 Sub-national clustering of radical and moderate workers 
 Analysis of sub-national variation identifies spatial clustering of both 
communist and APRA support among industry workers. The value of Moran’s I for 
the communist parties indicates a positive, but weak global spatial autocorrelation. 
Moran’s I for APRA indicates a somewhat stronger global autocorrelation than for 
communist votes. In the case of communist supporting workers, there are six high-high 
clusters. The largest clusters, A, C, and D, are located in important mining enclaves in 
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the deprived peripheries in the Andean highlands. In these regions, communist led and 
radical unaffiliated but communist supporting labor unions were active. The 
identification of the mining regions as radical areas is also in accordance with the 
findings of Soares/Hamblin and Petras/Zeitlin. Thus, clusters A, C, and D confirm H3. 
Cluster B is located in eastern parts of Cusco, in a region characterized by mining 
centers of minor importance. Available data does not provide information about the 
size of these centers, nor whether labor unions were active here. Due to the lack of 
precise data, the question of whether cluster C strengthens H3 remains uncontested. 
The minor clusters E (Chancay) and F (Piura) are both non-mining industrial regions 
and located in the coast. The CGTP was active in the petroleum industry in the north, a 
factor that may contribute to the explanation of high communist support in the Piura 
region. However, there are high-high clusters in communes relatively far away from 
the petroleum industry the coastal Talara region. Recall also Planas’ comment on the 
regional support base of the Partido Socialista del Perú (PSP); the party had its main 
constituency in Piura and did not present electoral lists in 15 departamentos (page 29 
above). Whether labor’s support to PSP was due to social structure, organizational 
factors, the personality of its leaders, or a combination of all, is not possible to decide 
with available data. Available data does not provide information as to explain the 
existence of communist support in these regions. In conclusion, it seems reasonable 
that the existence of clusters A, C, and D confirms H3. 
On the other side, one large low-low cluster in the LISA map of communist 
support is located in La Libertad, in “the solid north”. This brings the discussion over 
to APRA supporting regions. The low-low cluster in the communist map coincides 
with one of the largest high-high cluster in the map of APRA support. Large part of 
Cluster I is located in the relatively affluent coastal agro-industrial regions in La 
Libertad and Lambayeque, which strengthens Lafferty’s theory. However, one part of 
cluster I includes Cajamarca, and there is a large cluster in Amazonas and San Martin, 
all three departamentos without significant industry and with relatively low levels of 
prosperity. The presence of these clusters is not explained by Lafferty’s theory. In 
conclusion, the existence of cluster I confirms H4. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Deficient historical qualititative data in order to describe more broadly and with 
depth and precision the process of interaction between social structure, workers, 
unions, and political parties, and the statistical uncertainty in the ecological estimates, 
permit only tentative conclusions. However, some tendencies seem clear. First, social 
structure had a larger impact on communist support than on APRA support. The 
impact of social structure on the former was in addition somewhat higher in 
communes were there was large concentrations of workers. Social structure had no 
effect on APRA support, and the support was somewhat lower in communes with high 
proportions of workers. It appears that Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory is 
strengthened if only the communists are considered. Second, workers’ support to the 
communists was especially strong in the Andean mining enclaves weak in the large 
modern industrialized communities in the northern coastal regions, with the exceptions 
already mentioned. Conversely, industry workers’ support for the social democrats 
was strong in the modern industrialized communities in the northern coastal regions, 
and weak in the mining regions in the Andean highlands. These findings strengthen 
Lafferty’s theory. However, Sulmont and Sartori point to alternative explanations of 
the observed patterns. If those communes where communist votes outweighed APRA 
votes are identified as those regions in which the communists were the first to establish 
the “apparatus mass party”, then communist support may “coincide systematically 
with the occupancy of an organizational void, rather than with objective conditions of 
deprivation” (Sartori 1990: 168-169). “In that case, what we really are observing, via 
class behavior, is the impact of an organizational variable, the influence of party and 
trade union control”. Class conditions are then only a “facilitating condition” and the 
class receives its identity from the party (op.cit. 169). This coincides with Sulmont’s 
argument: workers experience of class identity was the result of active labor unions, 
and the incipient consciousness of class was not translated into a general political and 
ideological consciousness and solid political organization (Sulmont 1980: 178). Now, 
Sulmont and Sartori’s arguments do not necessarily weaken Lafferty’s basic structural 
explanation. The fact that the communists were able to influence the mining unions in 
the first place and that APRA retained influence in the unions in the “Solid north” 
 77
despite communist takeover of large union sectors in the 1970s imply that there were 
some conditions present in these two broad regions that opened up for workers 
acceptance of the different ideologies. 
Differences in the organizational nature of APRA versus the communist parties, 
i.e. the former’s verzuiling, may also contribute to the explanation of the large clusters 
of social democrat support in the non-industrial regions in the northern sierra and 
Amazon regions. However, available data does not provide information in order to 
discuss this further. The existence of APRA supporting workers in the large regions in 
northern Peru, and high levels of communist support outside large mining regions 
remain unexplained. Available data does not permit testing the implications of 
Knutsen’s theory. Among the possibly existing crossing cleavages that may have had 
effect on labor’s voting is the religious cleavage perhaps the most important. Labor 
ideology may have been incompatible with workers’ religious convictions, especially 
in smaller, peripheral communes where the Catholic Church had strong influence. 
However, communist support was high in many small rural communes, as in 
Ayacucho and Huancavelica. The existence of patron-client relations, mainly in minor, 
rural regions, may further contribute to the explanation of observed patterns. The 
economic cleavage may also have been “badly translated” by the unions and the left 
parties (cf. Sulmont’s argument above on the relationship between union and party).  
Further research on the process of cleavage formation in Peru is imperative, 
including a precise description and explanation of the process of interaction between 
labor, unions, and parties; the availability of more reliable statistics; and a specific 
model construction in order to test hypotheses. 
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6. Conclusion 
The main purposes of this thesis has been to measure the effect of social structure 
on a) industry workers’ party choice, and b) to identify regions where high proportions 
of workers voted for respectively the social democrats and the communists in the 1980 
presidential election in Peru.  
The effect of social structure on party choice has been measured by the extent to 
which workers’ support to the left parties was above the national average. The 
conclusions depend on the classification of APRA: average worker support to the 
overall left was the same as the national average, about 44 %. In other words, there 
was no effect of social structure. However, if APRA is excluded and only the 
communist parties are considered, the estimates show that workers’ level of support 
was above the national average. Approximately 23 % of all industry workers voted for 
the communists, and the level of support increased slightly in communes with high 
proportions of workers. In the case of APRA, the level of support declined slightly in 
communes with higher proportions of workers. Labor’s support to the communists was 
strongest in the poor mining regions in the Andean highlands, while APRA 
strongholds were concentrated in the north, especially in the agro-industrial regions.  
The clusters of communist support are explained by a combination of the effects of 
social structure and pro-communist labor unions’ political socialization of the workers. 
APRA clusters are explained by a combination of social structure, the presence of 
social democratic unions, and the party’s verzuiling strategy. Although the party 
choice of large sectors of industry workers was anchored in the economic conflict 
between owners and workers, the relationship between workers, unions, and political 
parties had not been consolidated into an economic cleavage. 
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